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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 20000202-CA 
v. : 
RICHARD NORRIS, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction on pleas of guilty to two counts of 
communications fraud, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
1801(1) (1995). entered pursuant to State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah 1988) (statute in 
Add. A). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) 
(Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Should this Court dismiss for lack of jurisdiction defendant's claim of 
error in the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas where no 
final appealable order appears in the record? 
This issue is controlled by rules 3(a) and 4(b), Ltah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Absent a final order, the appellate court lacks junsdiction to hear an appeal See State \ 
Rawhngs, 829 P 2d 150, 153 (Ltah App 1992) (citing Gallardo v Bchnder. 800 P 2d 
816, 817 (Ltah 1990) (per curiam)) 
2. Should this Court decline to address defendant's claim of error in the trial 
court's refusal to appoint substitute counsel to help him present his Motion to 
Appoint Substitute Counsel and his Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Pleas where no 
final order appears of record on the first motion, and the record is devoid of support 
for defendant's claim on the second motion? 
No standard of review applies to this issue 
3. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion for a bill of 
particulars where defendant had sufficient information to prepare an adequate 
defense without the need for a bill of particulars? 
The sufficiency of an information and the adequacy of notice are questions of law 
reviewed on appeal for correctness. See State v Wilcox, 808 P 2d 1028, 1031 (Utah 
1991), State \ Montova. 910 P 2d 441, 443 (Ltah \pp ), cert denied, 919 P 2d 1208 
(Utah 1996). This Court will not reverse a trial court's decision to deny a bill of 
particulars unless it finds that the trial court abused its discretion See State \ Sv^app, 
808 P 2d 115, 117 (Utah App.). cert, denied, 815 P 2d 241 (1991). 
*> 
4. Did the trial court properly rule that the instant prosecution was not 
barred by the statute of limitations? 
The application or tolling of a statute of limitations is a question of law reviewed 
for correctness See Estes v Tibbs, 1999 UT 52,«[ 4, 979 P 2d 823, Julian v State, 966 
P 2d 249, 252 (Utah 1998), Gramhch v Munsev, 838 P 2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1992) 
5. Was defendant denied the effective assistance of trial counsel based on 
counsel's failure to file his request for a bill of particulars earlier, failure to 
sufficiently prepare for trial, and coercion of defendant to enter guilty pleas where 
the record shows defendant had sufficient notice with which to prepare his defense 
without a bill of particulars, and the record does not support the remaining claims 
of deficient performance? 
An issue of ineffective assistance, raised for the first time on appeal, is resolved as 
a matter of law. State v Munson. 972 P 2d 418, 422 (Utah 1998), State v Huggins, 920 
P 2d 1195, 1198 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 929 P 2d 350 (Utah 1996). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are relevant to the issues presented herein and are 
contained in the brief or in the addendum as noted 
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801(1) (1995) (in Addendum A), 
Ltah Code Ann. § 76-1-302 (1999), 
Ltah Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 & 4 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
1. The criminal conduct giving rise to these proceedings occurred from March 
through June, 1993 (R. 0165). 
2. Defendant was initially charged in December 1994 with four misdemeanor 
counts of communication fraud in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) in the 
Third Circuit Court, West Valley Department (R. 0165, 0384, 0621-22). 
3. In February 1996, on defendant's motion to quash the misdemeanor charges, 
the circuit court judge dismissed the charges on the ground that the aggregate of the four 
counts exceeded the circuit court's junsdictional limit of SI,000 (R. 0165, 0387-88, 0678-
83). 
4. The West Valley City Attorney appealed the dismissal to the Utah Court of 
Appeals (R. 0165, 0388, 0700-08). 
5. In October 1996, the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office charged defendant in 
the Third District Court with eleven felony counts of communications fraud (R. 0165, 
0176,0232,0392,0730-35). 
6. Defendant moved to quash the felony charges because the West Valley appeal 
was still pending and had not yet been dismissed by the Court of Appeals (R. 0166, 0393-
1
 Because defendant entered conditional pleas, the procedural history is taken from 
statements in the memoranda of both parties that are in agreement, from various court 
documents attachments thereto, and from a copies of two dockets which are attached in 
Addendum B. This is not all-inclusive of the numerous filings v^hich occurred in the 
course of this case. 
4 
94, (T40) Judge Palmer granted the motion without prejudice on December 10, 1996 
advising the State that the felony charges could be refiled once the misdemeanor appeal 
was dismissed (R 0166, 0232, 0394, 0740) 
7 The State immediately sought to dismiss the appeal (R 0201-02, 0394, 0"42) 
Defendant opposed the dismissal because of the prosecutor's intent to file felony charges 
once the appeal was dismissed, but the trial court ultimately denied his motions and 
dismissed the appeal on March 26, 1997 (R 0785, 0788-89) 
8 In early April, 1997, ten of the felony charges were re-filed on the belief that 
the West Valley misdemeanor appeal had been dismissed (R 0166, 0182-86, 0399, 800-
04) 
9 Defendant moved to dismiss the felony charges on April 10, 1997, arguing that 
the necessary remittitur had not been issued by the Court of Appeals Judge Dever 
granted defendant's motion the next day, dismissing the charges without prejudice and 
advising the State that charges could be re-filed once the remittitur arrived (R 0166, 
0232, 0400-01, 0809, docket #1 at 3) 
10 Defendant also sought dismissal of the charges with prejudice on April 25, 
1997 (R 0401,0809), and filed supplemental documents on July 15, 1997 (R 0810) 
That motion was denied on November 19, 1997 (R 0810-11) 
11 The remittitur issued on May 13, 1997 (R 0790), and the State refiled twenty 
felony communication fraud charges on Ma> 15, 1997 (R 0166, 0189-9~\ 0233, 0402, 
5 
0815-23) (information attached in Addendum C). Defendant asked the court of appeals 
to reconsider the dismissal because the prosecutor intended to file felony charges (R "90, 
1066-67), filed a cert petition with the Utah Supreme Court based on the same point (R 
1067), then filed an extraordinary wnt to recall the remittitur because it v\as filed pnor to 
expiration of the time for filing a petition for wnt of certioran (R. 210, 214, 791-92, 796, 
1066-67). 
12. Defendant sought to stnke the information May 20, 1997, but Judge Reese 
denied the motion on May 22 (docket #2 at 4). 
13. Upon defendant's filing of an extraordinary wnt, the Utah Supreme Court 
ordered recall of the remittitur on June 26, 1997 (R. 0398, 0792, 0795). The Court of 
Appeals recalled its remittitur by order dated June 30, 1997, and defendant sought 
certioran review of the order dismissing the appeal in the Utah Supreme Court and the 
United States Supreme Court (R. 0398-99, 0792, 0795). Both courts denied certioran 
review, and the case was again remitted on October 30, 1998 (R. 0166-67, 0216, 0233, 
0399,0406,0792-93,0831). 
14. While pursuing the misdemeanor appeal on certioran, defendant again sought 
dismissal of the felony charges on September 26, 1997 (docket #2 at 5). 
15. On November 19, 1997, after several additional filings and appearances in the 
tnal court by defendant and during the pendency of the certioran proceedings, Judge 
6 
Dever denied defendant's motion to dismiss and ordered no further hearings, motions or 
argument until the case was remitted from the court of appeals (R. 0405, 0810-11). 
16 After the October 30, 1998 remittitur issued, defendant again moved to 
dismiss the felony counts with prejudice (docket #2 at 7). Add. B. Judge Dever denied 
the motion on December 4, 1998, and set the case for preliminary hearing (id.). Add. B 
17 The preliminary hearing occurred on February 3, 1999, with an additional 
witness examined by counsel on February 26 (R. 145-47; docket #2 at 7-9). Add. B. The 
State dismissed of eight of the twenty charges (id.). Add. B.2 
18. On February 23, 1999, defendant moved to dismiss the charges, alleging that 
the applicable statute of limitations had run (R. 159-217). 
19. On April 16, 1999, the State filed an amended information accurately 
reflecting the remaining twelve felony counts of communications fraud (R. 218-23) 
(information attached in Addendum C). 
20. By order filed June 8, 1999, Judge Palmer denied defendant's motion to 
dismiss, finding that the statute of limitations was tolled by defendant's motion to quash 
the original felony charges and his subsequent appeals (R. 0233). 
2At this point, defendant had an outstanding motion to dismiss with prejudice the 
previous information containing ten counts (R 0402) Judge Dever denied the motion on 
February 2, 1999 (R. 0402, 1008). Defendant unsuccessfully attempted to appeal that 
decision and to obtain certioran review m the Ltah Supreme Court (R. 0402-03, 1010-14, 
1016). Add B 
7 
21 Defendant filed an objection to the State's proposed order on the statute of 
limitations on June 21, 1999 (R. 235-39). 
22. Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, which had been representing 
defendant, then withdrew and Gregory G. Skordas was appointed to represent defendant 
(R. 240-45). 
23. Between September 28 and October 29, 1999, defendant, through counsel, 
sought and obtained an extension of the time to file several motions (R. 264-68). He 
subsequently filed several motions, some pro se and some through counsel, including a 
motion to stnke an expunged record, a motion to appoint substitute counsel and stay the 
proceedings, a supplemental request for discovery, and a motion for a bill of particulars 
(R. 264-68, 270-72, 273-82, 305-17, 319-27, 328-52; docket #2 at 16). 
24. At an October 21 motion hearing, the trial court granted defendant's 
supplemental discovery request and denied the motions to strike the expunged record and 
to appoint substitute counsel (docket #2 at 16-17). Add. B. 
25. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider his request for substitute counsel and a 
stay of the proceedings on November 15, 1999—two days prior to trial (R. 364-1123). 
26. Defendant appeared for tnal on November 17, at which time the court heard 
argument on new matters raised in his motion to reconsider (R. 1536: 2-10). The court 
then denied the motion (R. 1536: 10). The court also heard argument on defendant's 
motion to continue the trial, which included a request to appoint new, paid counsel (R. 
8 
1536 12-21) Defendant was accompanied at the time not only by his counsel of record, 
but by Da\ id Gnndstaff, an attorney defendant had retained to represent him at trial (R 
1536 12) The trial court heard argument, then denied both the request for a continuance 
and the request for appointment of paid counsel (R 1536 12-22, 24) In so doing, the 
court noted that before appointment of Mr Skordas and again only two days before the 
tnal date, defendant had represented himself to be indigent, yet he appeared for tnal with 
paid counsel, whom he wanted appointed (R 1536 13,20-21). The court also denied 
defendant's motion for a bill of particulars, expressly noting that defendant waited long 
into these proceedings before filing it then failed to seek compliance until the day set for 
trial (R 1536 22). 
27 Following a recess, defendant entered conditional guilty pleas to counts I and 
III of the amended information (R. 1536 25-26, 53-54). The remaining counts were 
dismissed, defendant executed an affidavit in support of the plea, and the court conducted 
a thorough rule 11 colloquy (R. 1189-96, R 1536: 26-54). 
28 Two weeks later, on December 1, 1999, defendant moved to withdraw his 
guilty pleas and again requested appointment of substitute counsel, claiming errors not 
only in the taking of the plea but in previous rulings on defense motions (R 1203-12^9) 
He supplemented that motion fourteen days later with two additional ineffective 
assistance of counsel arguments (R. 1280-1333) 
9 
29 On December 20, 1999, defendant filed a petition for extraordinary writ in thib 
Court, asking for appointment of substitute counsel for his attempt to withdraw his pleas 
(R 1457-76) This Court denied the writ as frivolous on its face (R 1477) 
30 On January 3, 2000, defendant was sentenced to zero-to-five years on each of 
the two counts, with the sentences to run consecutively (R. 1481-88). 
31. The same day, defendant sought a certificate of probable cause (R 1489-95, 
docket #2 at 19). On February 14, 2000, the tnal court denied both the application for a 
certificate of probable cause and defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas (R. 
1519-21, docket #2 at 20). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant purported to operate a business that sold diet products (R. 0607, 0648) 
During the spring of 1983, defendant ran ads in Utah newspapers promising a SI400 00 
per month salary and benefits for diet consultants (R. 0608, 0610-12, 0647-48).3 When 
someone answered an ad, defendant would give a presentation and produce several 
contracts relating to the diet products (R. 0608, 0610, 0613). Defendant purported to 
explain the terms of the contracts and obtained signatures from several people (R 0608, 
0611, 0613). While the individuals believed they were agreeing to take delivery of the 
Because defendant entered conditional guilty pleas, the facts are taken from the 
amended intormation in the misdemeanor case (attached to one of defendant's affidavits) 
and the police report incorporated into the felony information upon which this case rests 
(also attached to the same affidavit) (R 0605-14, 0646-48) 
10 
product to sell in conjunction with consulting others, they were instead signing contracts 
to purchase the diet products themselves (R. 0608-11, 0614, 0648). Defendant directed 
the individuals to use the product so as to ha\e first hand knowledge of it, then refused all 
attempts to return the product, in part because it had been opened (R. 0608, 0612, 0648). 
Despite defendant's promises in the ad and in person, the victims in this case received no 
salary, received none of the promised benefits, and incurred unanticipated debt (R. 0608, 
0648). Defendant then sued the victims in small claims court for alleged breach of the 
contracts when the individuals refused or could not afford to pay for the diet products (R. 
0648). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: Defendant challenges on multiple grounds the trial court's denial of his 
motion to withdraw his conditional guilty pleas. However, this Court should dismiss 
these claims for lack of jurisdiction because the record is devoid of any final order from 
the trial court denying defendant's motion. Absent a final order, this Court is without 
jurisdiction to entertain these claims. 
POINT II: Defendant claims that the trial court erroneously refused to grant him 
substitute counsel to help him pursue both his pre-plea motion to appoint new counsel and 
his post-plea motion to withdraw his pleas. This Court should refuse to reach his first 
claim because the record does not reflect anv ruling on this specific issue and lacks a 
transcript of the motion hearing at which the motion was apparently argued, making the 
11 
record inadequate to permit appellate re\ lew This Court should reject defendant's claim 
as to the withdrawal motion because the record establishes that defendant had counsel, 
and the record fails to show that defendant established an entitlement to substitute counsel 
below. 
POINT III: This Court should refuse to reach the merits of defendant's claim that 
the tnal court erroneously denied his motion for a bill of particulars because defendant 
fails to argue prejudice. On the merits, defendant had sufficient information about the 
charges against him with which to prepare an adequate defense, justifying the tnal court's 
denial of his motion for a bill of particulars Defendant undeniably knew the allegations 
in the information and the attached probable cause statement and had a copy of the initial 
police report incorporated therein. That alone provided sufficient information to 
defendant with which to prepare an appropriate defense. However, defendant also had 
the benefit of a fVill preliminary heanng eight months before he requested a bill of 
particulars. All of the victims identified in the information testified at the preliminary 
heanng, as well as two additional state's witnesses, and defense counsel actively cross-
examined them. The State offered into evidence six documents upon which it intended to 
rely, giving defendant ample information about the communications involved in the 
prosecution. Nothing suggests that any ambiguity remained to prevent defendant from 
prepanng an adequate defense. 
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Moreover, in light of the large amount of information available to defendant the 
prolonged delay in requesting a bill of particulars, and his failure to seek judicial 
intervention prior to the day of trial, the record suggests that defendant harbored other 
motives in seeking a bill of particulars, including an intent to manipulate the system to 
obtain further delay or an intent to establish invited error. This should be viewed with 
disfavor by this Court. 
POINT IV: Defendant takes an inconsistent and untenable position in asserting 
that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for violation of the statute of 
limitations. He claims that the State's appeal of dismissal of the misdemeanor charges 
prevented the State from filing any felony charges arising from the same course of 
conduct dunng the pendency of the appeal, but argues, without support, that the statute of 
limitations continued to run throughout the duration of the appeal. His argument amounts 
to no more than an attempt to creatively manipulate the judicial system. Defendant was 
responsible for extending the State's appeal more than two-and-one-half years beyond the 
time the State sought to voluntarily dismiss it, and he now seeks the ultimate benefit for 
his efforts—to escape responsibility for his conduct He fails to acknowledge that the 
felony case was not a duplicative filing of the misdemeanor charges, and he cites no 
authority providing that a district court cannot accept the filing of a felony information 
while an appeal is in progress on related misdemeanor charges Further, he cannot 
establish any abusive practice in the May 15 filing of the felony information 
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P O I M V : This Court should reject defendant's claims of ineffective assistance a^  
defendant fails to establish either deficient performance or prejudice Defendant faults 
his counsel for filing a late request for a bill of particulars when there was no abuse of 
discretion in the tnal court's rejection of the request. He also claims ineffectiveness for 
counsel's alleged failure to investigate and interview witnesses without identifying any 
witnesses, their testimony, or record basis to believe counsel neither investigated nor 
interviewed them. He notes a lack of proposed jury instructions, defense exhibits and 
subpoenas without establishing that counsel's failure to submit these things pnor to tnal 
"fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" in this case. Moreover, the only 
record evidence relating to defendant's claim of coercion by his counsel in entenng the 
guilty pleas contradicts defendant's claims of involuntanness. 
Apart from these allegations of deficient performance, defendant fails to argue 
prejudice, stating only that absent counsel's deficient performance, he would have gone to 




THIS COURT SHOULD DISMISS DEFENDANTS FIRST CLAIM 
INVOLVING DENIAL OF HIS MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS 
PLEAS BECAUSE NO FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER HAS BEEN 
ENTERED, LEAVING THIS COURT WITHOUT JURISDICTION 
TO REACH THIS CLAIM 
Defendant claims that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to withdraw his 
guilty pleas. Br. of Aplt. at 21-29. He contends that withdrawal should have been 
allowed because the plea was entered "under immense pressure" from his attorney, 
counsel was not prepared to proceed to trial on the date set for trial, and counsel misled 
defendant about the benefits he would receive under the plea agreement. Id. at 21. 
This Court may not reach defendant's claim. Defendant is entitled to appeal "from 
all final orders and judgments'' by filing a timely notice of appeal. Utah R. App. P. 3(a) 
& 4(a). Absent a final order, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to hear an appeal. See 
State v. Raw lings, 829 P.2d 150, 153 (Utah App. 1992). Oral statements made from the 
bench are not appealable. See State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1978). Until a 
formal order is entered, the time for filing a notice of appeal does not run, and the notice 
of appeal filed in this case can have no effect. Utah R. App. P. 4(b). 
On December 1, 1999, defendant filed a motion, supporting memorandum and 
affidavit seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas (R. 1203-79). On December 15, he filed a 
supplemental motion, supporting memorandum and affidavit (R. 1218-21, 1224-25) The 
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State filed a memorandum in opposition on December 22 (see docket P2 at 18)/ Add. B. 
Following a hearing, the trial court orally denied defendant's "Motion to Withdraw Guilty 
Plea" (id. at 20). Add. B. However, neither the minute entry of the motion hearing nor 
any signed order appears in the record on appeal. Only an unsigned proposed order 
prepared by the prosecutor appears in the record (R. 1522-24) (attached in Addendum 
D)5 
As no final order appears on the record, this Court is without jurisdiction to hear 
this claim, and it must be dismissed. See Rawlings, 829 P.2d at 153. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO ADDRESS THE TRIAL 
COURT'S REFUSAL TO APPOINT SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL FOR 
PRESENTATION OF TWO MOTIONS BECAUSE THE RECORD IS 
INSUFFICIENT TO PERMIT REVIEW OF THE ISSUE AS TO ONE 
MOTION, AND DEFENDANT DID NOT ESTABLISH A RIGHT TO 
SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL AS TO THE OTHER 
Defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to 
appoint substitute counsel to help him pursue one of his pre-plea motions to appoint new 
counsel and his post-plea motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Br. of Aplt. at 30-32. He 
does not challenge the trial court's failure to remove Greg Skordas as counsel at either 
juncture, but instead challenges the trial court's failure to provide him with counsel other 
Although the State's memorandum is not in the pleadings file, the district court 
docket notes that the State filed one. 
"Defendant attached the unsigned proposed order to his docketing statement in this 
appeal. 
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than Skordas to help him advance the claims involved in both motions. He contends that 
he should not have been required to argue both motions pro se because: both hearings 
were "critical stages" of his prosecution due to the State opposition to both motions; he 
was essentiallv unrepresented by counsel at the heanng on the pre-plea motion because of 
the adversanal position taken by his counsel at the heanng; and ''numerous constitutional 
nghts were at stake" in the withdrawal hearing. Id. at 30-32. This Court should refuse to 
reach defendant's claim as to the pre-plea motion because of the absence of a ruling on 
the issue in the appellate record, rendenng the record inadequate to obtain appellate 
review of his claim. This Court should also reject defendant's claim relating to the 
motion to withdraw his pleas because the record reflects that defendant had counsel at 
that stage of the proceedings and does not reveal that he established any entitlement to 
substitute counsel to present his withdrawal motion. 
A. Pre-Plea Motion to Dismiss Defense Counsel 
1. The record 
On October 12, 1999, defendant filed a pro se pre-plea motion, with a 
memorandum and supporting affidavit, entitled "Motion to Appoint Substitute Counsel 
and Stay Proceedings" (R. 305-17, 319-21). In that motion, defendant sought removal of 
his counsel Greg Skordas, and argued that he was entitled to the appointment of substitute 
counsel to help him present an ineffectiveness claim (R 305-17).b The docket reflects 
h \ o response from the State appears in the record or on the docket. Add B 
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that the trial court denied the "Motion to Substitute Counsel" at the motion hearing on 
October 21, 1999 (docket #2 at 16-17) ~ Add B The docket also shows an order was 
filed November 2, 1999 (id_ at 17) Add B However, the only order in the record, which 
defendant attached to his docketing statement, is an unsigned proposed order drafted by 
the prosecutor and sent to defendant's counsel on November 1, 1999 (R. 353-55) 
(attached in Addendum D) This order addresses the issue of defense counsel's dismissal 
but does not address defendant's request for temporary counsel to help present the motion 
(R 353-55) No transcript of the October 21 motion hearing appears in the record. 
Two days before trial, defendant filed a motion to reconsider his earlier motion, 
(R 364-1123, 1124-85). He objected to the unsigned order denying his request to dismiss 
Mr Skordas, but he did not renew his request for appointment of counsel to help with the 
motion (R. 365-4251124-85). Instead, he mentioned the trial court's earlier denial of the 
request for help as one of the reasons he was feeling pressure to enter guilty pleas (R 
373, 1133) An unsigned document entitled fciInner-Office Request for Ruling" reflects 
the trial judge's decision to deny the renewed motion to disqualify defense counsel, but 
makes no mention of the original request for substitute counsel to present the motion (R 
318) (attached in Addendum D). No other order appears in the appellate record on this 
issue. 
The docket entry apparently takes the place of a minute entry, as no separate 
minute entry appears elsewhere in the record The docket entry provides only the ruling 
without additional detail concerning arguments or reasoning 
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The day tnal was set to begin, the trial court heard argument on the new issues 
raised in defendant's motion to reconsider involving reasons for Vlr. Skordas' removal, 
then denied the motion (R. 1536: 2-10) (attached in Addendum D). During the 
exchange, no one mentioned the original request for substitute counsel to help defendant 
with his claim against Mr. Skordas, and nothing sheds any light on the tnal court's 
handling of that onginal request. Consequently, the record does not contain any verbal or 
wntten order addressing the issue defendant raises on appeal: his entitlement to substitute 
counsel to help him prepare and present his motion to dismiss his tnal counsel. 
2. The absence of a ruling requires rejection of the appellate claim 
Generally, there is no per se rule requinng that new counsel be appointed every 
time defendant presents a pro se motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. See 
People v Baltimore, 685 N.E.2d 627 (111. App. 3 Dist.), reh'g. denied, (October 8, 1997) 
Defendant is entitled to new counsel only upon a proper request and a proper showing. 
See People v. Diaz, 834 P.2d 1171, 1214-15 (Cal. 1992) (dealing with a post-tnal motion 
for a new tnal based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims); People v. Towns, 675 
N.E.2d 614, 620-21 (111. 1996) (if claim lacks ment or pertains to matter of tnal strategy, 
no substitute counsel is necessary; addressing post-tnal motion for new tnal), cert, denied. 
522 U S. 826 (1997); State v. Gallagher, 19 P 3d 817, 820 (Mont. 2001) (defendant 
carnes the burden of proof and must present matenal facts establishing a total lack of 
communication; bare unsupported allegations are insufficient to warrant appointment of 
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new counsel), State v Stout 35 P 3d 1198, 1203 (Wyo. 2001) (requiring a showing ot 
good cause) 
"Where there is no indication in the record on appeal that the trial court reached or 
ruled on an issue, this court will not consider the issue on appeal/' State v Pacheco, 778 
P 2d 26, 29 (Utah App. 1989) (refusing to reach a claim of trial court error in denying a 
pretrial motion to suppress evidence where defendant did not obtain an oral or wntten 
ruling on the record) (citing Cunningham v Cunningham, 690 P 2d 549, 552 n.2 (Utah 
1984)). Moreover, defendant has the burden of providing a sufficient record to permit 
appellate review of his claims of error. See State v Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 
1982); State v. Wulffenstein. 657 P 2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982), cert, denied. 460 U.S. 1044 
(1983); Whetton v. Turner. 28 Utah 2d 47, 49, 497 P.2d 856, 858 (1972), cert, denied. 
414 U.S. 862 (1973); State v Hamilton. 18 Utah 2d 234, 239, 419 P 2d 770, 773 (1966) 
It is clear from the current record that the trial court did not believe that defendant 
had met his burden of proving that Mr. Skordas should be dismissed. However, it is 
wholly uncertain how, or even if, the trial court handled the issue of defendant's request 
for substitute counsel to help him establish that Mr. Skordas should be dismissed. Even 
the denial of the motion to substitute counsel which appears in the docket appears to have 
dealt only with whether Mr. Skordas should be dismissed, as reflected in the unsigned 
order, not whether defendant was entitled to appointment of counsel to argue whether Mr 
Skordas should be dismissed. Neither is it apparent whether defendant was able to make 
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a proper showing at the October 21 * hearing of the claims set forth in his original motion 
for substitute counsel. Absent a sufficient record upon which to review defendant's claim 
of error, this Court must presume the propriety of the proceedings below See State \ 
Mead, 2001 I T 58,«[ 48, 27 P.3d 115; Rawhngs. 829 P 2d at 152; State v Hovt. 806 P 2d 
204, 209 (Utah App. 1991) (assuming the propriety of proceedings below where 
defendant failed to meet his burden of creating a record for appellate review of his 
constitutional claim). 
B. Post-Plea Motion to Withdraw Pleas 
1. The record 
Defendant's December 1, 1999, motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and the 
supporting documents include a request to appoint substitute counsel to help defendant 
present the withdrawal motion (R. 1203-65, 1334-96).8 At sentencing on January 3, 2000, 
defendant asked for a ruling on his request for an attorney to help with the withdrawal 
motion but did not present an argument (R. 1537: 46-47) (attached in Addendum D). 
The court inquired into the possibility of two other counsel doing the motion: defendant's 
appellate counsel (R. 1537: 47-50), and the counsel defendant was ready to hire the day 
trial was supposed to begin (R. 1537: 47). Add. D Appellate counsel was present and 
refused to present the motion, and defendant claimed that hiring the other attorney would 
sThe supplemental documents filed on December 15 did not address the issue of 
substitute counsel to help present the motion (R 1280-1333, 1409-56). 
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be cost prohibitive (R. 1537: 47-50). The court then verbally refused to remove Mr. 
Skordas for purposes of pursuing the withdrawal motion (R. 1537: 47-48, 50). Add. D. 
The docket thereafter reflects that the trial court denied the withdrawal motion at a 
heanng on February 14, 2000, but neither the docket nor the unsigned written order 
makes any mention of defendant's request for substitute counsel to present the motion (R. 
1522-24; docket #2 at 20). Add. D & B, respectively. 
2. The record is devoid of support for defendant's claim of entitlement to the 
appointment of substitute counsel to present his motion to withdraw his pleas, 
requiring rejection of his appellate claim 
Whether or not the presentation of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is a "critical 
stage" of criminal proceedings at which defendant is entitled to counsel, defendant is not 
automatically entitled to substitute counsel, and this Court should reject defendant's claim 
of error in the trial court's refusal to appoint substitute counsel at defendant's request. Br. 
of Aplt. at 30-31. Defendant overlooks the fact that he had counsel at that time. Mr. 
Skordas was counsel of record for defendant at the time he sought withdrawal of his 
pleas. The trial court refused to remove Mr. Skordas, and defendant does not directly 
challenge that ruling or the basis therefor on appeal. His argument as to this motion 
focuses only on his right to have counsel present his motion to withdraw. Consequently, 
defendant was not "forced" to present the withdrawal motion pro se. Id. at 32. 
Defendant sought substitute counsel, arguing once again that Mr. Skordas was 
ineffective, both before and at the time the pleas were entered, and that he needed help 
i i 
presenting the withdrawal motion, which also alleged counsel's ineffectiveness, among 
other things (R 1203-33, 1291-93) However, the record reflects that defendant 
presented no more than allegations in support ot his efforts to remove Vtr Skordas at thi* 
juncture, thereby justifying the tnal court's refusal to remove him See Diaz, 834 P 2d at 
1214 (dealing with a post-trial motion for a new tnal based on ineffective assistance ot 
counsel claims, defendant must show good cause for appointment of substitute counsel to 
present the motion), Towns, 675 N E 2d at 620 (defendant must establish the merit of his 
claims or that they do not relate to a matter of tnal strategy before substitute counsel may 
be appointed to pursue a motion for new tnal), Gallagher, 19 P 3d at 820 (defendant 
carnes the burden of proof and must present matenal facts establishing his claim, bare 
unsupported allegations are insufficient to warrant appointment of new counsel), Stout, 
35 P 3d at 1203 (requinng a showing of good cause before substitute counsel is 
appointed) See a]so Jacobs v State, 2001 UT 17 J 21, 20 P 3d 382 (setting forth the 
requisite elements for a claim of ineffectiveness). State v Silva, 2000 (JT App 292, *[ 22, 
13 P 3d 604 (same). 
Because the record does not show that defendant established a nght to substitute 
counsel to present his motion to withdraw his pleas, and defendant in fact had counsel, 
this Court should reject defendant's claim of error and atfirm the tnal court's denial of his 
request for substitute counsel 
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POLM III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DEMED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A BILL OF PARTICLL\RS BECAUSE 
DEFENDANT HAD SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO PREPARE 
AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE WITHOUT THE NEED FOR A BILL OF 
PARTICULARS 
Defendant claims that the information was constitutionally deficient because it 
gave him insufficient notice of the particulars of the charges, and that the tnal court erred 
in denying his motion for a bill of particulars to remedy the problem. Br. of Aplt. at 32-
39. Specifically, he claims the information and the probable cause statement fail to 
describe the nature of the communication on which the charges are based, and the 
specifics of the ''promise" defendant failed to keep to each victim. Id. at 36-37. 
Defendant also argues that the request for a bill of particulars filed by his counsel 
nineteen days before tnal gave the State ample opportunity to respond prior to tnal, and 
the tnal court's failure to require a response from the State "was clearly an error." Id. at 
38-39 9 However, the record conclusively shows that defendant had ample notice of the 
9
 Alternatively, defendant argues that the tnal court abused its discretion in denving 
his motion for a continuance. Br. of Aplt. at 39 n 3 However, while he notes that such a 
decision may constitute reversible error if there is a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result for the defendant in its absence, he fails to make any attempt to establish 
such a likelihood in this case. Id. (citing State v Featherson, 781 P 2d 424, 431 (Ltah 
1989)) Hence, his alternative argument fails for inadequate bnefing See State v 
Br\ant, 965 P 2d 539, 549 (Utah App. 1998) ("L tah courts routinely decline to consider 
inadequately bnefed arguments," including those without meaningful legal anaKsis or 
with summary assertions of error). 
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charges against him, as well as the factual basis for those charges, without the need tor a 
bill of particulars. 
A. The Tnal Courts Ruling 
Defendant filed a motion for a bill of particulars on October 29, 1999—nineteen 
days before tnal (R 328-30) In it, he requested "that the State be required to state with 
particulanty what factual information they intend to provide at tnal to prove the essential 
elements of each of the offenses as charged [I]t is unknown what scheme or artifice 
to defraud the state is intending to rely on in proving the numerous charges of 
communication fraud m this case " (R 328-29) 
The tnal court heard argument on defendant's motion for a bill of particulars on 
the morning set for tnal (R. 1536: 14-15, 17-18,23-24). Following argument, the court 
ruled: 
Now, the failure to respond to the Bill of Particulars concerns me a little bit, 
but I would deny a motion to continue on those grounds, because number 
one, the motion apparently wasn't filed until October the 29th of this year, 
which would have been just about two to three weeks ago, number two, 
there had been no attempt to enforce that or request a response to it pnor to 
today's date, and it would seem to me that if you were anxious to have that 
information, Counsel and Mr Norns, vou should have asked for the State's 
response and made some effort to have the Court order them to comply 
before today's date. So it's a little bit late, and I won't postpone the tnal for 
those reasons. 
(R 1536 22) (attached in Addendum E) " 
10Defendant claims the tnal court denied his motion for a bill of particulars 
because it was untimely filed. Br ofAplt at 38-39 However, a motion for a bill of 
^S 
B_ This Court should Summanlv Reiect Defendant's Claim for Inadequate Briefing 
Any error in the tnal court's denial of defendant's motion for a bill of particulars 
requires reversal only when this Court concludes that, "absent the error, there was a 
reasonable likelihood of a result more favorable to the accused." State v Bell, 770 P 2d 
100, 106 (Utah) (citing State v Knight. 734 P 2d 913, 919-21 (Utah 1987)), reh'g denied, 
Nov 25, 1988. Defendant argues that without the bill of particulars, he had insufficient 
information with which to prepare his defense Br. of Aplt. at 39 However, he fails to 
make any attempt to establish that, had his motion been granted, there was a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome Moreover, defendant could not establish a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome in light of all the information he 
possessed about the State's case pnor to filing his motion for a bill of particulars. See 
discussion at subpoint C, infra. 
Because defendant makes no attempt to brief this aspect of his claimed error, this 
Court should reject his argument and affirm the tnal court's ruling. See State v Brvant, 
965 P 2d 539, 549 (Utah App. 1998) ("Utah courts routinely decline to consider 
inadequately briefed arguments"). 
particulars is timely so long as it is filed in writing at least five days pnor to tnal L tah R 
Cnm P 12(b)(1) (any request or objection based on defects in the information must, 
however, be made by wntten motion at least five days pnor to tnal) The court's ruling 
makes it clear that it was not the motion itself that was untimely, but defendant's attempt 
to force compliance with the motion on the day set for tnal that was untimely and suspect 
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C. The Record Reflects Defendant had Ample Information to Enable him to 
Adequately Prepare his Defense 
1 The law 
Defendant essentially raises a question of adequate notice A defendant is 
constitutionally entitled to adequate notice of a charged offense. State v. Wilcox, 808 
P.2d 1028, 1031-32 (Utah 1991). A defendant is entitled to know "the nature and cause 
of the accusation against him." Utah Const, art. I, § 12; see State v. Burnett, 712 P 2d 
260, 262 (Utah 1985); State v. Peterson. 681 P 2d 1210, 1221 (Utah 1984) (Stewart, J -
concurring in part and dissenting in part); State v Bush, 2000 UT App 10,1f 14, 412 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 35. Utah law provides that "the accused [must] be given sufficient information 
4so that he can know the particulars of the alleged wrongful conduct and can adequately 
prepare his defense.'" State v. Fulton, 742 P 2d 1208, 1214 (Utah 1987) (citing Burnett, 
712 P 2d 260, 262 (Utah 1985)), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1044 (1988); see also Utah R. 
Cnm. P. 4(e); Wilcox, 808 P.2d at 1032; Bush, 2000 UT App 10, If 16; Swapp. 808 P 2d 
at 117-18. If an information fails to provide a defendant with sufficient information to 
enable him to prepare a defense, he may request a bill of particulars. See Bell, 770 P 2d 
at 105, Swapp, 808 P.2d at 118. 
"A bill of particulars is not a device to enable the defendant to obtain a preview of 
the prosecution's evidence." Swapp, 808 P 2d at 118. Instead, an "information or 
indictment is legally sufficient even if it consists of nothing more than an extremely 
summary statement of the charge," provided the accused has sufficient information to 
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prepare a defense See Bell 770 P 2d at 104, see also Swapp, 808 P 2d at 118 The more 
information available to a defendant, the less likely an information will be seen as 
deficient See, e g , Swapp, 808 P 2d at 118-20 (finding adequate an information 
accompanied by a twelve-page probable cause affidavit and a subsequent memorandum 
entitled "Principles of Accomplice Liability and of Legal Causation") 
2 The charging documents 
As stated, the issue is whether defendant had sufficient notice of the nature and 
cause of the accusations to justify the tnal court's denial of his request for a bill of 
particulars 
Defendant's argument focuses on the information, the probable cause statement, 
and the prosecutor's statement at the change of plea hearing of the factual basis for 
defendant's guilty pleas. He justifies this with a quote from Bell "[a] defendant, hav ing 
complied with the procedural requirements of rule 4(e)[, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure,] in requesting a bill of particulars, ought not to have to look beyond the 
indictment or information and the bill of particulars to obtain sufficient notice of the 
specific allegations to be faced at tnal " Br of Aplt at 38 (quoting Bell , 770 P 2d at 
107) Defendant claims that because his request tor a bill of particulars was filed 
sufficiently in advance of tnal to permit the State to comply, the tnal court erred in failing 
to review the language of the information and find that language insufficient to permit the 
preparation of an adequate defense 
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Rule 4(e), Ltah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides: 
(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are 
required to inform a defendant of the nature and cause of the offense 
charged, so as to enable him to prepare his defense, the defendant may file a 
written motion for a bill of particulars. The motion shall be filed at 
arraignment or within ten days thereafter, or at such later time as the court 
may permit. . . . 
Defendant fails to note that he did not comply with the requirements of rule 4(e) where 
his motion for a bill of particulars not only was not filed within ten days after the 
arraignment, but was filed nearly eight months after the preliminary hearing and without 
any request for the tnal court's permission for the late filing (R. 328-30; docket nl at 7) 
Consequently, this Court should also consider the information defendant wholly ignores 
in his brief: the detailed police report expressly referenced and incorporated in the 
probable cause statement, as well as the evidence adduced at the preliminary heanng 
When the record is properly reviewed, it becomes clear that defendant had 
sufficient information to prepare his defense without the need for a bill of particulars. 
The starting point is the information, which contains the broad language of the 
communications fraud statute. In twenty similarly-worded counts involving ten victims, 
the information alleged: 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 
South, in Salt Lake County, State of Ltah, on or about March through June 
1993, m violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, 
a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud another or to 
obtain from [a named victim] money or anything of value by means of false 
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or matenal omissions. 
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and who, as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with 
a person by any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the 
scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the loss or the thing sought to be 
obtained is over S 1,000.00. 
(R. 2-9). Add. C. The information was later amended to allege twelve counts against six 
victims, each using the same language quoted above (R. 218-23). Add. C. The attached 
probable cause statement provides: 
Your Affiant bases this Information on police report #94-25376 and 
the following: 
1. During the Spring of 1993, the defendant ran an advertisement in 
the newspaper. The ad made certain promises and representations to those 
responding concerning employment and salary. Numerous people 
responded to the ad and met with the defendant. The defendant had each 
person sign an agreement with him. The defendant did not deliver as 
promised. The defendant then sued each person for over $1,000.00 and 
obtained judgments against many of these people. 
2. The defendant told several employees at his business that he 
never intended to fulfill any of the promises in the ad. The defendant back 
dated checks and altered records to cover up this scheme. 
(R. 9-10). Add. C. 
The plain language of the probable cause statement alone establishes a claim based 
on promises made in a newspaper ad which were not honored. However, defendant had 
additional information which made it clear to him that his representations relative to the 
contracts were also a basis for half of the charges. First, the inclusion in the information 
of two identical counts for each named victim suggests that the State intended to pursue 
charges based on the onginal ad and the subsequent contracts entered into by each \ ictim 
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Second, the probable cause statement incorporated a detailed police report w hich 
prov ided any and all additional information defendant may have felt he lacked There ib 
no doubt defendant possessed the report as it was attached to one of his pro se motions 
and was referenced in numerous documents he submitted below (R. 0384, 0605-14, 1065-
66) (attached in Addendum E). In the report, Officer Plotnick details his interviews of 
four people: 1) Kaylynn Crosby, a secretary to defendant for several months and who 
later testified at the preliminary hearing (R. 0145-47, 0607-09; docket #2 at 8); 2) Joan 
Mattson, the victim in counts I and II and a witness at the preliminary hearing (R. 0610-
11; docket #2 at 8); 3) Bonnie Gessell; and 4) Susan Hunter, the victim in counts XIX and 
XX and a witness at the preliminary hearing (R. 0612-14; docket #2 at 8). Add. E. 
The report reflects Kaylynn Crosby's detailed explanation of defendant's activities 
dunng the time she worked with him (R. 607-08). Add. E. The officer then summan/ed 
her account, with which she agreed: 
Mr. Norns would place an advertisement in the paper offenng a job 
with a salary of $1400.00 plus commissions and benefits. When the people 
would respond to the advertisements for a job they were given a 
presentation and sold some products on contract. When people would try 
and return the products they would be told that they could not due to the 
fact that they had opened the products and tned it as Mr Norns had 
instructed them to do. If they did leave the products behind Mr Norns 
would just re-seal them and give them out again. At no time did Mr Norns 
ever pay any sales people nor give them any benefits as promised in the 
advertisement. 
(R. 609). Add E The witness also informed Officer Plotnick of discussions she had 
with defendant: 
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[The witness] claims that she told [Mr Norns] that it was 
obvious to her that Mr. Norns had no intention of hiring employees as the 
advertisement described, and it appeared to her that Mr Norns's intentions 
were to mislead applicants into believ ing that they had employment when in 
fact the papaers [sic] that they were requested to sign were in fact purchase 
agreements for the diet product. 
(Id). Add. E. 
Joan Mattson explained that she had responded to a newspaper ad for a job as a 
"diet counselor" with "a salary of $1400 00 a month, expense allowance and company 
benefits." (R. 610). Add. E. Mr. Norns gave her and others a presentation and had her 
fill out an application (id.). Add. E. She signed several contracts, one of which "was a 
contract that she thought was just an agreement to accept responsibility for the products 
she was given" but was, unknown to her, "actually an agreement to purchase [the] 
product." (Id.). Add. E. Mattson said that "Mr Norns would quickly run over each 
contract and was very aggressive as he did it" but he would never fully explain the 
contracts (R. 611). Add. E. She stated that she did not understand that she was actually 
purchasing the product (id). Add. E. 
Thereafter, she received a letter telling her that the job "was a multi-level 
program" (id). When she confronted defendant, he told her not to tell others about it 
(id.) Add. E. She was led to believe that "she would be counceling [sic] people that [the 
company] brought in but instead she was expected to bnng in her own clients" (R. 610) 
When she asked defendant about pay, "she was told that she would be given commission" 
although that was not what the ad had stated (R 611) 
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Susan Hunter's interview contains similar detail (R 612-14) Add E The copy m 
the record is difficult to read, but the officer's summary reflects 
Susan answered an advertisement for a diet counselor This ad stated 
that the salary was SI400 00 per month and expenses When she responded 
on the ad for a diet counselor she was given a presentation and later signed 
a contract for the purchase of somt r Norns's product when she thought 
that she was just signing to take possession of the product. She later found 
that the contract that she signed was actually purchasing the product. 
(R. 614). Add. E. 
Given the identical wording in the information of all the counts, the similar 
detailed accounts of victims and witnesses in the police report, and the general statement 
of the State's case in the probable cause affidavit, defendant had sufficient information to 
alert him that the State intended to prosecute him for unkept promises made in the ad and 
misrepresentations made relative to the written contracts He also knew the scheme or 
artifice the State intended to establish at trial defendant's goal of luring in people with 
the ads with no intention of performing the promises in the ads, having them sign 
purchase agreements but representing them to be employment contracts, orchestrating 
their defaults under the contracts, then obtaining small claims judgments against them 
Defendant possessed ample detailed information to permit him to prepare an adequate 
defense 
3 The preliminary hearing 
Defendant also had the benefit of the entire preliminary hearing long before he 
sought a bill of particulars. A preliminary hearing ordinarily advises the accused of the 
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details ot the charges In this case, the State called eight witnesses, including the 
secretary whose account appears in detail in the police report, and all six ot the \ ictims 
named in the twelve counts remaining in the amended information (R 145-47, 218-22, 
docket ~2 at 9) ' Each of the witnesses presumably testified about their interactions w ith 
defendant, defendant admits that they identified "many different things that could be 
considered a scheme or artifice or a misrepresentation, or a false of [sic] fraudulent 
pretense, or a promise or a material omission * (R 370), and defense counsel actively 
cross-examined the witnesses (R 145-47, docket ^2 at 9) The exhibit list notes that the 
State offered into evidence two newspaper ads, two product installment agreements, an 
independent advisor compensation agreement, and an independent advisor application 
and agreement (R 148, see envelope marked "exhibits") 
Even without the testimonial details that would have been provided in a transcript 
of the heanng, it is clear from this record that ambiguity in the charging documents, if anv 
existed, was clarified at the preliminary heanng The fact that defendant waited another 
eight months to request a bill of particulars suggests he was not lacking in information, 
but harbored other motives for the filing 
11
 Defendant has not included a transcript of the preliminary heanng in the record 
on appeal It is reasonable, however, to assume that the v ictims' testimony reflected the 
same scenano repeatedly noted in the police report The State did not adjust its case in 
any apparent fashion after the preliminary heanng. and the prosecutor noted the dav ot 
tnal that "[t]he defense has the benefit of fitting through a preliminary heanng Thev 
have a transcript from the prelim That outlines essentially our case and everything that 
they're asking for, I think " (R 1536 17) 
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4 Conclusion 
There is no doubt that defendant had sufficient information available to him to 
obviate the need for a bill of particulars Defendant had sufficient information to prepare 
an adequate defense based on the information, the probable cause statement, and the 
police report incorporated therein. He participated in the preliminary hearing and heard 
the State's evidence from the named victims He waited eight more months before 
seeking a bill of particulars, then made no effort to force compliance with the request 
until the day of trial, suggesting that he may have intentionally attempted to create an 
appealable issue or obtain yet another delay See Parsons v Barnes, 871 P 2d 516, 520 
(Utah) (explaining the invited error doctrine and noting its disfavor on appeal), cert 
denied, 513 US 966 (1994): State v Perdue, 813 P 2d 1201, 1205 (Utah App 1991), 
affd, 900 P 2d 1093 (Utah 1995). Nothing m this record suggests that a lack of 
specificity prevented defendant from mounting his defense. There is no possibility in this 
case that defendant could have been lead into preparing a defense to a crime other than 
that with which he had been charged. On this record, defendant had sufficient 
information to prepare his defense without the need for a bill of particulars, and the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's untimely motion for one See 
Wilcox, 808 P 2d at 1033-34. 
i s 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RILED THAT THE STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS DID NOT B\R THE INST\NT PROSECLTION 
Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to dismiss 
because the statute of limitations had run. Br ofAplt at 39-44 He argues that because 
the State can pursue only one suit ansing from a single cnminal episode, and that suit was 
pending on appeal in the form of the misdemeanor charges, the State was prevented from 
filing the felony charges until the appeal ended and the case was remitted Id, at 40-42 : 
His argument erroneously assumes that the statute of limitations on all potential felony 
charges continued to run throughout the misdemeanor appeal because the charges all 
arose from the same cnminal episode. Id, 
A felony prosecution must be commenced within four years after the felony is 
committed. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-302(1) (1999) The conduct at issue occurred 
between March and June 1993 (R. 218-23) \dd C By order dated June 8, 1999, the 
tnal court denied defendant's motion and held that the effective date of the felony filing 
was May 15, 1997 (two days following issuance of the first remittitur), not October 30, 
1998 (the date of the final remittitur), as defendant contended (R. 232-33) (in Addendum 
F) The tnal court also ruled that defendant's motion to quash and his appeals tolled the 
running of the statute of limitations in this case (R 232-33). Add. F Defendant objected 
1
 defendant correctly notes that this case does not involve a double jeopardy 
violation because no jury had been impaneled Br of \plt at 42-43, n 4 
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to this order on June 21, 1999, but, due to the need to address multiple other motions 
dealing with indigency, counsel, and evidence, the court did not hear argument on his 
objection until a motion heanng on October 21, 1999 (R 356-57, docket *2 at 16-17) 
No minutes ot the heanng or signed order appear in the appellate record, but the docket 
reflects that the tnal court denied a "motion to dismiss" (docket #2 at 17), and the 
unsigned order, filed 15 days later, reflects that the tnal court denied defendant's "motion 
to dismiss" based on the statute of limitations (R 356-57) 
Defendant's view of the tolling of the statute of limitations is irrational He 
separates the running of the limitations penod for misdemeanors and felonies which anse 
from the same cnminal episode, assumes the filing of misdemeanor charges and the 
subsequent appeal tolls the limitations penod onl\ as to those misdemeanor charges and 
not as to the underlying cnminal episode (Br of Aplt at 41-42), then argues that both the 
filing and appeal of misdemeanor charges prevents the filing of a felony information 
relating to the same cnminal episode. Id. at 42, 44 His interpretation permits him to 
entirely escape responsibility for his cnminal conduct by prolonging the appeal after the 
State's voluntary dismissal so that the limitations penod would expire before any other 
court hadjunsdiction to accept a felony mtormation This is illogical because it would 
permit the limitations penod to run as to part of a defendant's conduct at a time when no 
tnal court has the ability to act on the cnminal conduct This would allow a defendant to 
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manipulate the system, as defendant did here, to prevent the State from ever pursuing a 
meritorious prosecution against a defendant 
A. The Mav 15 Filing was Valid, Rendering Discussion of the Statute of Limitations 
Unnecessary 
In this case, the trial court merely accepted the filing of the felony information 
This was the filing of a different case than the one on appeal, not a duplicative criminal 
complaint, as defendant claims. Br ofAplt at 42 The mere fact that the charges arose 
from the same criminal episode does not establish that they charge the same offense and 
must be pursued in the same case. Neither did it render the felony filing invalid The 
felony charges could not be tned in the circuit court, and they require the proof of an 
element not required for the misdemeanor charges, 1 e , an increase in the value of the 
property obtained by fraud. See State v Sosa, 598 P 2d 342, 344-45 (Utah 1979) 
(defendant could be tned in city court on a misdemeanor charge of carrying loaded 
firearm in vehicle, and thereafter tned in district court on a felony charge of possession ot 
firearm by a convicted person, both charges being based on defendam's one act of firing 
nfle from his van), State v Coolev, 575 P 2d 693, 694 (Utah 1978) (plea of guilty to two 
charges injustice of the peace court did not bar a subsequent prosecution in the distnct 
court for another offense ansing from the same cnminal episode that was not within the 
junsdiction of the justice of the peace court) 
Defendant relies heavily upon the Ltah Supreme Court's opinion in Hi-Countr\ 
Estates v Foothills Water, 942 P 2d 305 (Ltah 1996), for his claim that the distnct court 
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was without junsdiction to accept the felony filing during a time when the misdemeanor 
appeal was prematurely remitted. Br of Aplt at 41 However, that decision expresslv 
dealt with "whether the tnal court regained jurisdiction to enter a judgment or an order ot 
any kind" in a case that was on appeal, not in a new matter 942 P 2d at 307 In that case, 
the tnal court had modified a judgment upon premature remittitur, which judgment was 
on review in appellate proceedings Id_ The Supreme Court held that the case 
"exemplified] the basis for the rule prohibiting the tnal court from exercising junsdiction 
in a case while it is on appeal/' Id (emphasis added), see also See State v Brown, 856 
P 2d 358, 362 (Utah App. 1993) Accordingly, the case merely prevents the original tnal 
court from exercising junsdiction over the prosecution of a case pending on appeal It 
does not restnct a different court from exercising junsdiction over the filing of a different 
case lj 
Moreover, even if the distnct court's junsdiction were restncted by the appeal, it 
was not restncted as to every action available to the court. See Hi-Countrv. 942 P 2d at 
307 (holding that the tnal court could not "enter a judgment" dunng the penod of a 
nEven under defendant's interpretation, the case does not support his argument If 
the case prevents the tnal court from exercising am junsdiction "over a case while it is 
pending on appeal" (Hi-Country, 942 P 2d at 306), and, as defendant claims, this prevents 
the tnal court from exercising any junsdiction over the felony charges (Br of Aplt at 41), 
then it would necessanly be because the felonv charges were included in the case that was 
pending on appeal Hence, the statute of limitations would necessanly have been tolled 
as to the felony charges at the same time it was tolled as to the misdemeanor 
charges-upon the filing of the notice of appeal in the misdemeanor case 
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premature remittitur, but agreeing, in dicta, with a defense argument that execution o( a 
judgment would not be stayed by the filing of a petition for certioran review) No 
judgment or similarly binding order was entered in this case, and nothing in Hi-Countr\ 
suggests that the district court could not accept the filing of an information or that the 
statute of limitations was not tolled. The mere filing of an information in this case did 
nothing to affect the appeal which, at that point, consisted of defendant's efforts to obtain 
certioran review of this Court's dismissal of the appeal. This is especially so where the 
distnct court stayed the matter as soon as it became clear the appeal was on-going. 
Hence, the filing should be permitted under the circumstances of this case. 
Because the distnct court properly accepted the felony filing on May 15, 1997, this 
Court need not review defendant's claim that the statute of limitations as to the felony 
charges was not tolled by the filing of the misdemeanor charges that were based on the 
same cnminal conduct. Either the filing of the misdemeanor charges tolled the 
limitations penod as to the entirety of the cnminal conduct until completion of the 
misdemeanor appeal, or the limitations penod as to the felony charges continued to run 
but was timely tolled upon the May 15 filing See State v Strand, 674 P 2d 109, 112 
(Ltah 1983) (the filing of a defective information tolls the limitations penod). 
B_ Fundamental Fairness 
Defendant attempts to argue that this case demonstrates an extreme danger of 
''intentional prosecutonal harassment from repeated filings of groundless claims/' citing 
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to State \ Bnckey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986). Br of Aplt. at 43 First, there is nothing 
"groundless" about the State's charges where defendant admitted guilt to two of them and 
claims a real fear of conviction on all twelve (R 1536 53-54) Br of Aplt. at 24 
Second, Bnckev does not prevent the refiling of charges in all instances Instead, 
it was meant to emphasize the importance of ^fundamental fairness/' State v Morgan, 
2001 UT 87, ^  15, 432 Utah Adv Rep. 40. "[Wjhen potential abusive practices are 
involved, the presumption is that due process will bar refiling. When potential abusive 
practices are not involved, we hold that there is no presumptive bar to refiling " IdL 2001 
UTatH 16. 
Defendant cannot establish abusive practices in this case. The State did all it could 
to end the misdemeanor appeal before pursuing defendant in a new felony prosecution 
Once the remittitur issued, the State had every reason to believe that it could file its felonv 
case. When the remittitur was ordered recalled two months later, the State ceased its 
pursuit of the felony case. Instead, it was only through defendant's assertion of 
ineffective assistance of counsel issues, challenges to evidence and the charging statute, 
and filing of a motion to dismiss that the matter was repeatedly put before the trial court 
until, ultimately, the court properly recognized the need to suspend pursuit of the case 
until completion of the appellate process (docket 42 at 3-5). Add. B 
Not only does the record not support abusive practices in the State's May filing ot 
the felony information, but defendant benefitted from the filing inasmuch as it put him on 
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timelv notice that the State intended to pursue a felony prosecution based on the charged 
activity, that defendant would eventually be called upon to account for his activities in the 
event the court of appeals' dismissal of the misdemeanor appeal was affirmed, and that he 
should prepare a defense. It in essence gave defendant an additional seventeen months to 
prepare to answer the charges. 
Further, there is nothing "fundamentally unfair" in permitting the State to toll the 
limitations period if, in fact, the filing and appeal of the misdemeanor case did not toll it 
Any fundamental unfairness in the facts of this case arises from defendant's position that 
would permit him to entirely escape prosecution for his cnminal conduct by manipulating 
the system to prolong an appeal beyond the limitations period. 
Under the facts of this case, the filing of the felony charges in May was 
appropriate, as was the trial court's order staying any further proceedings on those 
charges pending completion of the appeal of the misdemeanor case. Accordingly, there 
was no abuse of the tnal court's discretion in denying defendant's motion to dismiss 
based on the statute of limitations. 
POINT V 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIV E ASSISTANCE FAIL 
BECAUSE THEY ARE LARGELY INStFFICIENT, DO NOT 
ENJOY RECORD SUPPORT, AND ARE SPECULATIVE 
Defendant claims that his tnal counsel rendered ineffective assistance under the 
Sixth Amendment because he. 
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1) failed to timely request a bill of particulars; 
2) appeared for trial "patently unprepared" where he did not investigate the State's 
witnesses, discuss witness statements with defendant, subpoena witnesses, or 
submit proposed jury instructions and exhibits; and 
3) pressured defendant into entering guilty pleas without prior discussion. 
Br. of Aplt. at 44-45. Defendant claims that absent counsel's ineffectiveness, he would 
have gone to trial, thereby establishing that the outcome of the proceedings would have 
been different. Id. at 45. 
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show both "that 
counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment," and "that counsel's deficient performance was 
prejudicial —i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." State v Litherland, 2000 LT 
76,1| 19, 12 P.3d 92 (citing Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)), 
State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 1997). In this case, defendant cannot establish 
the deficient performance prong of the test, permitting this Court to decide this claim 
without reaching the prejudice prong of the test. See State v. Strain, 885 P 2d 810, 814 
(Utah App. 1994) (in cases in which it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim 
based on a failure to establish one prong of the test, the appellate court will do so without 
addressing the second prong). 
Utah's appellate courts have repeatedly held, '"proof of ineffective assistance of 
counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality/" State v 
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Penman. 964 P 2d 1157, 1162 (Ltah App 1998) (quotine Fernandez v Cook. 870 P 2d 
870, 877(Ltah 1993)). see also State v Chacon, 962 P 2d 48, 51 (Utah 1998), State \ 
Coonce. 2001 I T App 355,«[ 18, 36 P 3d 533 
Thus, "where, on direct appeal, defendant raises a claim that tnal counsel was 
ineffective . . . , defendant bears the burden of assuring the record is adequate " 
Litherland. 2000 UT 76, at f 16. 'The necessary consequence of this burden is that an 
appellate court will presume that any argument of ineffectiveness presented to it is 
supported by all the relevant evidence of which defendant is aware/' Id. at U 17. 
Therefore, "[w]here the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or 
deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that 
counsel performed effectively." Id. 
Furthermore, in cases involving advice to plead guilty, "the defendant must show 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to tnal." Hill v Lockhart, 474 U S 52, 
59 (1985); see also State v Martinez. 2001 UT 12, «J 17, 26 P.3d 203, Alvarez v Galetka, 
933 P 2d 987, 990 (Utah 1997); Parsons, 871 P 2d at 525. 
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A. Deficient Performance 
1 Bill of particulars 
Defendant claims his tnal counsel was ineffective because he "failed to timely 
request a Bill of Particulars/' Br. of Aplt. at 45. This was deficient, he claims, because 
defendant could not prepare an adequate defense. Id. 
As established in Point III, supra, the motion for a bill of particulars was not 
untimely, but was filed nineteen days pnor to the date set for tnal. See Utah R Cnm. P 
12(b)(1) (permitting defenses and objections based on defects in the information to be 
made by wntten motion "at least five days pnor to the tnal"). Further, defendant had 
ample notice of the charges against him, as well as the factual basis for those charges, 
without the need for a bill of particulars. See Point III, supra. While the preliminary 
heanng pre-dated the appointment of Mr. Skordas, the prosecutor noted on the day set for 
tnal that defense counsel had the benefit of a transcnpt of the preliminary heanng, which 
representation defendant has never denied (R. 1536: 17). Consequently, defense 
counsel's failure to request a bill of particulars earlier in the proceedings did not leave 
defendant unable to prepare an adequate defense and did not constitute deficient 
performance. 
2. Tnal preparedness 
Defendant claims deficient performance in his tnal counsel's alleged failure to 
prepare for tnal. Br. of Aplt. at 45. He claims counsel did not investigate the State's 
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witnesses, discuss witness statements with him, subpoena defense witnesses, prepare 
exhibits, or submit proposed jury instructions. Id. However, the record does not support 
defendant's claims. 
Defendant provides no support for his conclusory statements that counsel did not 
investigate the State's witnesses or discuss witness statements with him, and the record is 
inadequate to determine whether or not counsel did these things. See Litherland, 2000 LT 
76, at f 17 (where record is inadequate or ambiguous, appellate court will presume that 
counsel performed effectively). Defendant makes no effort to identify the relevant 
witnesses or the information that a proper investigation or discussion would have 
revealed. Defendant's claim is entirely speculative and wholly inadequate to establish 
deficient performance.14 See State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 442 (Utah 1996) (rejecting 
claim of ineffectiveness where neither the record nor defendant's brief indicated what a 
proposed witness would have testified if called); State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, 1387 
14Defendant sought a remand pursuant to rule 23B, Utah Rules; of Appellate 
Procedure, prior to briefing in this matter. He asserted that the remand was necessary 
because the record was not adequate to fully evaluate the following ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims: failure to properly investigate the case, failure to subpoena witnesses, 
failure to prepare evidence for trial, failure to discuss the case with defendant for 
purposes of entering a well-informed plea; lack of preparedness for trial, coercion in the 
plea process; and misrepresentation as to a Sery plea and reservation of a vindictive 
prosecution claim. Memorandum in support of Motion to Remand for Findings 
Necessary to Determination of Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, pp. 4-12 
Defendant filed no affidavits apart from his own in support of his motion and failed to 
establish how he was prejudiced by counsel's advice to plead guilty. This Court denied 
the motion by order dated August 28, 2001. 
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(Utah 1988); see also Chacon. 962 P.2d at 51 (rejecting claim where defendant "has not 
produced affidavits detailing what the testimony of [his expert] would be or illustrated 
how that testimony would have helped him at tnar). 
Defendant also offers the absence of jury instructions and exhibits to establish 
counsel's unpreparedness for trial. However, neither side submitted proposed jury 
instructions, ample time remained for both counsel to prepare and submit them, and their 
absence does not establish the level of preparedness of either side. Just because they were 
missing from the record at the time the pleas were entered does not mean that counsel's 
conduct in preparing for trial "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.f,f The 
absence of defense exhibits is equally equivocal and readily justified for a number of 
reasons, including the fact that they are normally introduced during trial, and trial never 
occurred in this case. Moreover, defense exhibits were used at the preliminary hearing, 
undermining defendant's claims that none had been prepared (R. 148). Without more, 
this Court should assume the effectiveness of defense counsel's conduct as to these 
claims. See Litherland 2001 UT 76 at If 17. 
Similarly, the mere absence of defense subpoenas, without more, does not 
establish deficient performance as subpoenas are not always necessary to a defense. The 
lack of subpoenas may be justified by, among other things, the strategic decision of 
defense counsel not to call the witnesses or the agreement of the witnesses to appear 
voluntarily, neither of which would be reflected in the record. Moreover, defendant does 
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not identify any proposed defense witnesses, explain the relevance of their testimony or 
establish a need to subpoena them to ensure they appeared at trial. See State v \esse\. 
967 P 2d 960, 965 n 5 (Utah App. 1998) (requiring that defendant provide the "specific 
facets" of the proposed witnesses' testimony that could have helped his case) 
The sole potential support for defendant's claim in the record is a statement made 
in an affidavit submitted by David Gnndstaff, the attorney defendant sought to have 
replace Mr. Skordas on the day set for trial. Mr. Gnndstaff states, "Mr Skordas was 
anxious to have myself replace himself as counsel of record because he was unable to 
properly prepare for trial because of a lack of communication between himself and 
Defendant" (R. 1251). However, this statement offers nothing to supply the deficiencies 
in defendant's argument. It does not suggest that counsel felt improperly prepared 
because of inadequate investigation, an inability of counsel and defendant to agree to a 
single defense, or some other reason. 
Because the record does not permit review of defendant's claim, this Court should 
assume the validity of counsel's decision not to prepare subpoenas. See Litherland, 2000 
UT76at<I 17. 
3 Coercion by counsel to enter guilty pleas 
Finally, defendant contends that his counsel pressured him into entering his guilty 
pleas "when the plea had not been previously discussed" and counsel knew that defendant 
was intent on going to trial. Br. of Aplt. at 45 First, the plea had necessarily been 
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discussed where, in a motion filed two days before tnal, defendant represented to the trial 
court that he k;feels he is being railroaded to accept a plea of 2 felony counts" (R. 1133). 
Second, the record does not support defendant's claim of coercion but clearly 
establishes persuasive evidence of voluntariness. The "Statement of Defendant," which 
defendant signed in open court and which supported the entry of his guilty pleas, reflects 
that he entered the pleas voluntarily and in the absence of any threats, coercion or 
unlawful influence (R. 1190, 1193, 1194; R. 1536: 47) (attached in Addendum G). 
Defendant's verbal colloquy with the court shows that, despite ample opportunity to 
express doubt or concern with the entry of the plea, defendant insisted that the plea was 
voluntary and not the result of coercion: 
THE COURT: Do you feel that anyone has pressured you in any way 
or coerced you against your better judgment or will to plead guilty to the 
two charges? 
[DEFENDANT]: No, your Honor. 
(R. 1536:36). 
THE COURT: And again, you're pleading guilty voluntarily? 
[DEFENDANT]: Yes, your Honor. 
(R. 1536. 51). 
Defendant claims that his counsel directed him to respond falsely in that manner, 
but cites only to his own unsupported, unsworn allegations in his memorandum 
supporting his motion to withdraw the pleas below. Br. of Aplt. at 17. Where defendant 
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offers no record evidence of coercion, and the record dictates against it, his claim of 
deficient performance on this basis necessarily fails. See Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 
608, 617 (Utah 1994) (disposing of similar ineffective assistance claim because of the 
absence of record support), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 828 (1995). 
As defendant fails to establish deficient performance, this Court should reject his 
ineffective assistance of counsel challenge without addressing the prejudice prong. 
See Strain, 885 P.2d at 814. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
defendant's convictions and sentences. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of April, 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney GpfievaL 
/ 
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IS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Titles 76 and 77 
76-10-1801 CRIMINAL CODF 
PART 18 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
76-10-1801. Communications fraud — Elements — Penal-
ties. 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or 
to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false 
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and 
who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the 
purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or 
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is $100 or less; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or 
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $100 but does not 
exceed $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $1,000 but does not exceed 
$10,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or 
thing obtained or sought to be Obtained is more than $10,000 but does not 
exceed $100,000, 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to 
defraud is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value, and 
(f) a first degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is $100,000 or more 
(2) The determination of the degree of any ofTense under Subsection (1) shall 
be measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or 
sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) 
except as provided in Subsection (l)(e). 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the 
offense described in Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in 
Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing 
of value is not a necessary element of the offense 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or 
concealing a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and 
ofTense of communication fraud. 
(6) (a) lb communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, 
convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to 
talk over; or to transmit information 
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the 
mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and 
spoken and written communication 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made 
or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth 
History: C. 1963, 76-10-1801, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 157, $ 2; 1990, eh. 79, « I 
Addendum B 
iniKD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COluci' 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH vs. RICHARD F NORRIS 
\SE NUMBER 971005698 State Felony 
IARGES 
Charge 1 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: April 11, 1997 Dismissed 
Charge 2 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: April 11, 1997 Dismissed 
Charge 3 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: April 11, 1997 Dismissed 
Charge 4 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: April 11, 1997 Dismissed 
Charge 5 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: April 11, 1997 Dismissed 
Charge 6 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: April 11, 1997 Dismissed 
Charge 7 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: April 11, 1997 Dismissed 
Charge 8 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: April 11, 1997 Dismissed 
Charge 9 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: April 11, 1997 Dismissed 
Charge 10 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: April 11, 1997 Dismissed 
.RENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
L. A. DEVER 
TIES 
Plaintiff - STATE OF UTAH 
Defendant - RICHARD F NORRIS 
Represented by: MICHAEL A PETERSON 
2NDANT INFORMATION 
Defendant Name: RICHARD F NORRIS 
Offense tracking number: 7986995 
Date of Birth: May 15, 1955 
Social Security Number: 
Driver License Number: 
Driver License State: UT 
Law Enforcement Agency: WEST VALLEY POLICE 
LEA Case Number: 94-2 53 7 6 
Prosecuting Agency: SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Violation Date: May 01, 1993 
;ed: 10/13/98 12:57:44 Page 1 





April 02, 1997 Warrant Num: 971011721 Bail 
75000.00 
1997 Warrant Num: 971011721 Bail 
4-02-97 Filed: Information 
4-02-97 Warrant ordered on 
Allowed 
Bail amount: 
4-02-97 Warrant issued on: April 02, 
Allowed 
Bail amount: 75000.00 
Judge: ROBERT HILDER 
Issue reason: Failure to Appear. 
4-03-97 Warrant recalled on: April 03, 1997 Warrant num: 971011721 
Recall reason: Warrant recalled because defendant was 
booked. 
4-03-97 TBD scheduled on April 04, 1997 at 09:30 AM in Arraignment - S31 
with Judge ARRAIGNMENT. gmam 
14-03-97 PRELIM CALENDAR CALL scheduled on April 10, 1997 at 09:00 AM in 
Third Floor - W37 with Judge DEVER. 






































PRO: UPDERGROVE, KEN 
5 
1 
TAPE: 713 COUNT: 
ATD: None Present 
Deft is present 
Information was read in court 
PRE DSP scheduled for 04/10/97 at 0900 A in room 
HRG BOND scheduled for 04/04/97 at 0930 A in room 
CUSTODY: County Sheriff 
97 C/O DEFT APPOINTED LDA 
97 Arraignment scheduled on April 03, 1997 at 09:30 AM in 
Arraignment - S31 with Judge ARRAIGNMENT. 
9 7 BAIL REMAIN $75j3jOa 
97 THIS IS A RE-FfLE OF WgST VALLEY CASE #941004929 DISMISSED BY 
9 7 JUDGE WATSO 











PRO: UPDERGROVE, KEN 
TAPE: 720 COUNT: 
ATD: AMES, STEPHANIE 
Deft is present 
CUSTODY: County Sheriff 
DEF'S MOTION TO REDUCE BAIL TO $20,000 AND PTS. STATE OBJECTED, 
C/O DEF'S MOTION DENIED-BAIL REMAIN $75,000 
FILED NOTICE OF HEARING 
9 7 FILED MOTION FOR BOND REDUCTION 
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L. A. DEVER 
FILED APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL 
FILED RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
Hearing (PRELIM CALENDAR CALL): JUDGE: 
TAPE: 838 COUNT: 1791 
Deft Present 
ATD: PETERSON, MICHAEL A PRO: JONES, ERNIE 
COURT ORDERS ATD MOTION FOR DISMISSAL BASED JURISDICTION ISSUE 
IS TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT 
COURT ORDERS PARTIES TO SUBMIT MEMORANDUMS OUTLINING ALL THE 
FACTS OF ATD MOTION 
COURT ORDERS CASE SCHEDULED FOR MOTION HEARING 
Hearing (MOTION HEARING): JUDGE: L. A. 
TAPE: 840 COUNT: 1197 
Deft Present 
ATD: PETERSON, MICHAEL A PRO: JONES, 
ORAL ARGUMENT HEARD 
COURT ORDERS THAT WHILE THIS CASE IS PENDING BEFORE THE COURT 
OF APPEALS AND UNTIL THAT COURT ISSUES A REMITTITUR, THIS COURT 
IS PROHIBITED FROM PROCEEDING AND THEREFORE GRANTS DEFENSE 
MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 




































on 4/11/97 was cancelled 
Case disposition is Dismissed 
FILED MOTION TO RETURN SEIZED PROPERTY 
FILED ORDER **UNSIGNED-GIVEN TO AKJ* 
FILED LETTER FROM DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
LAD/AKJ PER REQUEST FROM DEFENSE COUNSEL, CASE SET FOR HEARING 
ON MOTION TO RETURN SEIZED PROPERTY 
STATE NOTIFIED BY PHONE 
FILED MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE AND REQUEST FOR APPOINT-
MENT OF COUNSEL 
FILED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE & REQUEST 
FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNCEL 
FILED AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE AND REQUEST 
FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
HEARING scheduled on May 08, 1997 at 09:00 AM in Arraignment -
S31 with Judge DEVER. 
Hearing: JUDGE: L. A. DEVER 
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5E NUMBER 971005693 State Felony 
-08-97 Deft Present audrey 
-08-97 ATD: PETERSON, MICHAEL A PRO: JONES, ERNIE audrev 
-08-97 COURT FINDS THAT THERE IS NO PROPERTY IN THIS CASE TO BE audrey 
-08-97 RETURNED AND THEREFORE DENIES DEFENSE MOTION TO RELEASE PROPERTYaudreyil 
-08-97 COURT WILL REVIEW CASE AND MAKE A DETERMINATION ON DEFENDANT'S audrey" 
-08-97 PRO SE MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE AND REQUEST FOR LEGAL audrey: 
-08-97 REPRESENTATION. audrey: 
-08-97 Began tracking Taken Under Advisement Review on 06/08/97audrey: 
-15-97 HEARING scheduled on May 16, 1997 at 02:00 PM in Arraignment -
S31 with Judge DEVER. audrey\ 
-16-97 Hearing: JUDGE: L. A. DEVER audrey 
-16-97 TAPE: 1071 COUNT: 14 audrey 
-16-97 Deft Present audrey 
-16-97 ATD: PETERSON, MICHAEL A PRO: JONES, ERNIE audrey 
-16-97 HRG scheduled for 06/12/97 at 0130 P in room ? with LADaudrey 
-16-97 C/O LDA RE-APPOINTED TO THIS CASE audrey, 
.-16-97 DEFENSE WILL FILE A MEMORANDUM TO SUPPLEMENT DEFENDANT'S PRO SE audrey 
.-16-97 MOTION. CASE WILL BE SET FOR HEARING AND ARGUMENT IN JUNE. audrey 
.-16-97 STATE WILL HOLD THE NEW WARRANT OF ARREST UNTIL THIS ISSUE IS audrey 
.-16-97 RESOLVED. audrey 
i-16-97 DEFENDANT IS ORDERED TO FILE AN AFFIDAVIT OF IMPECUNIOSITY WITH audrey 
i-16-97 THE COURT. audrey 
5-11-97 **ATD MIKE PETERSON CALLED REQUESTING ADDITIONAL TIME TO FILE audrey 
5-11-97 HIS MEMORANDUM AND HEARING CONTINUED FOR 7 TO 10 DAYS. audrey 
5-11-97 JUDGE DEVER AGREED TO THIS. HEARING CONTINUED. DEFENSE TO audrey 
5-11-97 NOTIFY THE STATE OF NEW DATE AND TIME audrey 
5-12-97 HEARING scheduled on June 30, 1997 at 01:30 PM in Arraignment -
S31 with Judge DEVER. audrey 
5-16-97 FILED NOTICE OF HEARING sharor 
5-17-97 Taken Under Advisement Review date changed to 07/05/97kerih 
5-30-97 **JUDGE JOHNSON IS COVERING FOR JUDGE DEVER TODAY audrey 
5-3 0-97 JUDGE DEVER NEEDS TO HEAR THIS CASE audrey 
5-30-97 STATE AND DEFENSE AGREE TO NEW DATE audre> 
7-02-97 FILED NOTICE OF HEARING sharor 
7-15-97 FILED SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS sharor 
7-15-97 WITH PREJUDICE sharor 
7-15-97 FILED SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS sharor 
7-15-97 WITH PREJUDICE sharor 
7-15-97 FILED NOTICE OF HEARING sharoi 
7-25-97 HEARING scheduled on August 21, 1997 at 01:30 PM in Arraignment 
- S31 with Judge DEVER. audre1 
7-25-97 **COURT OF APPEALS HAS TAKEN BACK REMITITUR. C/O HEARING CONT audre' 
8-21-97 Hearing: JUDGE: L. A. DEVER audre 
18-21-97 TAPE: 1785 COUNT: 3319 audre 
18-21-97 Deft Present audre 
(8-21-9 7 ATD: PETERSON, MICHAEL A PRO: BYRNE, FOR JONES audre 
JS-21-97 C/O STATE TO SUBMIT BRIEF BY 9/9/97 audre 
33-21-97 DEFENSE THEN WILL HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND IF THEY WISH, audre 
)8-21-97 COURT ORDERS DEFENSE COUNSEL TO NOTIFY COURT WHEN TO SET FOR audre 
Printed: 10/13/98 12:57:45 Page 4 
fi0810 
c exuny 
8-21-97 NEXT HEARING. audrey 
8-22-97 Tracking started for Stay / Clerk Stay. Review date Sep 21, 
1997. audrey 
3-22-97 Ended tracking of Taken Under Advisement audrey 
3-22-97 Began tracking Stay / Clerk Stay Review on 09/21/97audrey 
3-08-97 HEARING scheduled on October 15, 1997 at 02:00 PM in Arraignment 
- S31 with Judge DEVER. audrey 
)-08-97 **PER REQUEST FROM LDA CASE SET FOR HEARING audrey 
)-08-97 CLERK NOTIFIED: M. PETERSON, JEFF GREY, DAVE MADDOX, ERNIE JONESaudrey 
)-15-97 HEARING scheduled on November 19, 1997 at 09:00 AM in 
Arraignment - S31 with Judge DEVER. audrey 
1-15-97 Hearing: JUDGE: L. A. DEVER audrey 
1-15-97 TAPE: 2133 COUNT: 484 audrey 
1-15-97 Deft Present audrey; 
'-15-97 ATD: PETERSON, MICHAEL A PRO: GILL, FOR JONES audrey; 
-15-97 HRG scheduled for 11/19/97 at 0900 A in room ? with LADaudrey; 
-15-97 CASE CONTINUED TO REMAIN WITH 971008355. audrey; 
-18-97 FILED MOTION AND MEMORANDUM TO STRIKE UCA 76-10-1801 AS tsl 
-18-97 UNCONSTITUTIONAL tsl 
-19-97 Hearing: JUDGE: L. A. DEVER audreyj 
-19-97 TAPE: 2464 COUNT: 600 audreyj 
-19-97 Deft Present audreyj 
-19-97 ATD: PETERSON, MICHAEL A PRO: JONES, ERNIE audreyj 
-19-97 COURT DENIES DEFENSE MOTION TO DISMISS CASE 971008355 AND WILL audreyj 
-19-97 ENTERTAIN NO ADDITIONAL HEARINGS, MOTIONS OR ARGUMENT UNTIL audreyj 
-19-97 THERE IS A REMITUTUR FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS. audreyj 
-05-98 Filed: state's response to deft's motion to strike 76-10-1801 as 
unconstitutional debbiep 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT - 5LC 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH vs. RICHARD F NORRIS 
CASE NUMBER 971008355 State Felony 
CHARGES 
Charge 1 - 76-10-1801 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: November 17, 1999 Guilty Plea 
Charge 2 - 76-10-1801 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: November 17, 1999 Dismissed 
Charge 3 - 76-10-1801 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: November 17, 1999 Guilty Plea 
Charge 4 - 76-10-1801 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: November 17, 1999 Dismissed 
Charge 5 - 76-10-1801 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: November 17, 1999 Dismissed 
Charge 6 - 76-10-1801 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: November 17, 1999 Dismissed 
Charge 7 - 76-10-1801 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: November 17, 1999 Dismissed 
Charge 8 - 76-10-1801 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: November 17, 1999 Dismissed 
Charge 9 - 76-10-1801 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: February 03, 1999 Dismissed 
Charge 10 - 76-10-1801 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: February 03, 1999 Dismissed 
Charge 11 - 76-10-1801 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: November 17, 1999 Dismissed 
Charge 12 - 76-10-1801 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: November 17, 1999 Dismissed 
Charge 13 - 76-10-1801 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: February 03, 1999 Dismissed 
Charge 14 - 76-10-1801 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: February 03, 1999 Dismissed 
Charge 15 - 76-10-1801 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
rinted: 03/09/00 14:53:21 Page 1 
SE NUMBER 9^1003355 State Felony 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: February 03, 1999 Dismissed 
Charge 16 - 76-10-1801 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: February 03, 1999 Dismissed 
Charge 17 - 76-10-1801 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: February 03, 1999 Dismissed 
Charge 18 - 76-10-1801 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: February 03, 1999 Dismissed 
Charge 19 - 76-10-1801 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: November 17, 1999 Dismissed 
Charge 20 - 76-10-1801 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: November 17, 1999 Dismissed 
Charge 21 - 76-10-1801 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: November 17, 1999 Dismissed 
RRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
ROBIN W. REESE 
JRTIES 
Defendant - RICHARD F NORRIS 
Represented by: MICHAEL A PETERSON 
Represented by: REBECCA C HYDE 
Plaintiff - STATE OF UTAH 
Represented by: ERNEST W. JONES 
1FENDANT INFORMATION 
Defendant Name: RICHARD F NORRIS 
Offense tracking number: 
Date of Birth: May 15, 1955 
Social Security Number: 
Law Enforcement Agency: WEST VALLEY POLICE 
LEA Case Number: 94-25376 
Prosecuting Agency: SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Sheriff Office Number: 0078837 
Violation Date: March 01, 1993 
ICOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 62.00 
Amount Paid: 6 2.00 
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5-15-97 Warrant ordered on: May 15, 1997 Warrant Num: 971018392 Bail 
Allowed 
Bail amount: 150000.00 
5-15-97 Warrant issued on: May 15, 1997 Warrant Num: 971018392 Bail 
Allowed 
Bail amount: 150000.00 
Judge: ROBIN W. REESE 
Issue reason: Failure to Appear. 
5-15-97 Case filed 
5-15-97 Note: CASE FILED BY DET PLOTNICK-WVCPD REFERED TO CASE 
#971005698 
5-15-97 Note: THIS CASE WAS DISMISSED W/PREDJUDICE BY JUDGE DEVER ON 
4/11/97 
5-20-97 Note: FILED EX PARTE MOTION TO QUASH ARREST WARRANT,STRIKE 
INFORMATION 
5-20-97 Note: AND REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
5-20-97 Note: FILED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE MOTION TO QUASH 
ARREST 
5-20-97 Note: WARRANT, STRIKE INFORMATION AND TO APPOINT COUNSEL 
5-20-97 Note: FILED AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT TO QUASH ARREST WARRANT, 
STRIKE 
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Motion scheduled on May 22, 
S31 with Judge REESE. 
Note: REESE/MJD DEFT MOTION TO QUASH ARREST WARRANT 
Note: C/O TO BE SET FOR MOTION 
Warrant recalled on: May 22, 1997 Warrant num: 971018392 
Recall reason: Warrant recalled because defendant 
appeared. 
Hearing (MOTION HEARING): JUDGE: Robin W. Reese 
TAPE: 1115 COUNT: 47 
Deft Present 
ATD: MADDOX, DAVID PRO: UPDEGROVE, KEN 











C/O BW RECALLED PENDING DECISION ON CASE #971005698 
C/O CASE SET FOR HEARING BEFORE JUDGE DEVER 
*CLERK SENT ORDER TO RWR* 
FILED: SIGNED ORDER 
REQUESTING ADDITIONAL TIME TO SUBMIT **ATD CALLED 
MEMORANDUM. 
Note: JUDGE GRANTED REQUEST 
Note: LDA WILL NOTIFY STATE 
HEARING scheduled on June 30, 
S31 with Judge DEVER. 
Note: FILED MOTION TO 
Note: FILED AFFIDAVIT 
WARRANT 
Note: **JUDGE JOHNSON IS COVERING FOR JUDGE DEVER TODAY. 
Note: THIS CASE NEEDS TO BE HEARD BY JUDGE DEVER 
STATE AND DEFENSE AGREE TO NEW DATE. 
**COURT OF APPEALS HAS TAKEN BACK REMITATUR, C/O HEARING 
AND HEARING CONTINUED. 
OF NEW DATE. 
1997 at 01:30 PM in Arraignment 
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 




-25-97 HEARING scheduled on August 21, 1997 at 01:30 PM in Arraignment 
- S31 with Judge DEVER. 
-25-97 Note: STATE AND DEFENSE NOTIFIED BY PHONE 



































ATD: PETERSON, MICHAEL PRO: BYRNE, 
COURT ORDERS .STATE TO SUBMIT BRIEF BY 9/9/97 
DEFENDANT MAY FILE A RESPONSE IF HE WISHES AND THEN 
COUNSEL TO 
Note: NOTIFIY COURT TO SET FOR A HEARING. 
Note: COURT ORDERS THAT IF MR. MADDOX NO LONGER REPRESENTS 
DEFENDANT 
Note: HE NEEDS TO FILE A WITHDRAWL OF COUNSEL AND THEN MR. 
PETERSON 
Note: MAY ENTER HIS APPEARANCE ON THIS CASE. 
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ZASS NUMBER 971C33355 State Felony 
08-22-97 Note: Began tracking Stay / Clerk Stay Review on 
09/21/97 audrev] 
FILED WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL *DAVID MADDOX-ATD* sharcnn 
FILED APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL-MICHAEL PETERSON candices 
FILED REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY candices 
FILED MOTION TO DISMISS candices 
10-09-97 HEARING scheduled on October 15, 1997 at 02:00 PM in 
Arraignment - S31 with Judge DEVER. audrey] 
10-15-97 HEARING scheduled on November 19, 1997 at 09:00 AM in 










Hearing: JUDGE: L. A. DEVER audrey] 
TAPE: 213 3 COUNT: 484 audrey] 
Deft Present audrey] 
ATD: PETERSON, MICHAEL A PRO: GILL, FOR JONES audrey] 
HRG scheduled for 11/19/97 at 0900 A in room ? 
with LAD audrey] 
LO-15-97 Note: COURT ORDERS DEFENDANT TO FILE AN AFFIDAVIT OF INDIGENCY 
W/IN audrey] 
LO-15-97 Note: 10 DAYS. COURT ORDERS HEARING CONTINUED. audrev] 
L0-17-97 Note: FILED AFFIDAVIT OF INDIGENCY debbieo 
LI-17-97 Note: FILED MOTION/MEMORANDUM TO STIRKE carmelle 
Ll-18-97 Note: FILED MOTION AND MEMORANDUM TO STRIKE UCA 76-10-1801 AS tsl 
.1-18-97 Note: UNCONSTITUTIONAL tsl 
LI-19-97 Note: Hearing: JUDGE: L. A. DEVER audrey] 
Ll-19-97 Note: TAPE: 2464 COUNT: 600 audrey] 
.1-19-97 Note: Deft Present audrey] 
.1-19-97 Note: ATD: PETERSON, MICHAEL A PRO: JONES, ERNIE audrey] 
.1-19-97 Note: COURT DENIES DEFENSE MOTION TO DISMISS AND WILL ENTERTAIN 
NO audrey] 
.1-19-97 Note: FURTHER MOTIONS, HEARINGS, OR ARGUMENT UNTIL THERE IS A audrey] 
.1-19-97 Note: REMITATUR FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS. audrey] 
11-05-98 Filed: state's response to deft's motion to strike 76-10-1801 
as unconstitutional debbieo 
.0-07-98 STATUS CONFERENCE scheduled on October 16, 1998 at 08:30 AM in 
Third Floor - W3 7 with Judge DEVER. audrey] 
.0-07-98 Note: LAD/AKJ - Per call from LDA the appeal which has had this 
case stayed is over and case needs to be set for review/status 
conference. Review date given and LDA and State notified by 
phone. audrey] 
0-14-98 Note: Copied tapes 97-1115, 97-1785, 97-2133, and 97-2464. renem 
0-16-98 STATUS CONFERENCE scheduled on December 18, 1998 at 08:30 AM in 
Third Floor - W37 with Judge DEVER. audrey] 
0-16-98 Minute Entry - Law & Motion continued audrey] 
Judge: L. A. DEVER 
PRESENT 
Clerk: audreyj 
Prosecutor: ERNIE JONES 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MICHAEL A PETERSON 
'rinted: 03/09/00 14:53:22 Page 5 
,SE NUMBER 971008355 State Felony 
Video 
Tape Number: video Tape Count; off 
CONTINUANCE 
The Stipulation of counsel has made a motion for continuance of Law 
& Motion. 
The motion is granted. 
Both parties agree that this hearing be continued for a status 
conference in December. This hearing may not be neccessary and it 
may also be continued depending upon status of appeal. 
STATUS CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 12/18/1998 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - W3 7 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
4 50 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
before Judge L. A. DEVER 
J-16-98 STATUS CONFERENCE Continued. audreyj 
Reason: Correct Calendar 
)-19-98 Fee Account created Total Due: 45.00 renem 
3-19-98 AUDIO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 45.00 renem 
L-10-98 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE scheduled on November 13, 1998 at 01:45 
PM in Third Floor - W37 with Judge DEVER. audrey] 
L-13-98 MOTION TO DISMISS scheduled on December 04, 1998 at 02:30 PM in 
Third Floor - W37 with Judge DEVER. audrey] 
L-13-98 Minute Entry - Minutes for INCOURT NOTE audrey] 
Judge: L. A. DEVER 
PRESENT 
Clerk: audrey] 
Prosecutor: ERNIE JONES 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MICHAEL A PETERSON 
Video 
Tape Number: video Tape Count: 3-41-59 
MOTION TO DISMISS is scheduled. 
Date: 12/04/1998 
Time: 02:30 p.m. 
Location: Third Floor - W3 7 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
4 50 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
before Judge L. A. DEVER 
1-16-98 Filed: memorandum in opposition to deft's motion to dismiss 
with pre]udice decbiep 
rmted: 03/09/00 14:53:23 Page 6 
CASE NUMBER 971C0S355 State Felony 
11-23-98 Filed: state's supplemental memorandum in opposition to motion 
to dismiss 
12-04-98 Warrant ordered on: December 04, 1998 Warrant Num: 972036710 
Bail Allowed 
Bail amount: 150000.00 
12-04-98 Warrant issued on: December 04, 1998 Warrant Num: 972036710 
Bail Allowed 
Bail amount: 150000.00 
Judge: L. A. DEVER 
Issue reason: Based on the probable cause statement. 
12-04-98 Tracking ended for Stay / Clerk Stay. 
12-04-98 Notice - WARRANT for Case 971008355 ID 220353 
12-04-98 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOTION TO DISMISS 
Judge: L. A. DEVER 
PRESENT 
Clerk: audreyj 
Prosecutor: ERNIE JONES 
Defendant 







Tape Number: video Tape Count: 2-46-4 0 
HEARING 
After hearing oral argument, court denies defense motion to 
dismiss and defense motion to dismiss with prejudice. 
Case is set for preliminary hearing on a special setting. 
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 02/03/1999 
Time: 10:00 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - W37 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
4 50 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
before Judge L. A. DEVER 
L2-04-98 PRELIMINARY HEARING scheduled on February 03, 1999 at 10:00 AM 
in Third Floor - W37 with Judge DEVER. 
12-07-98 Filed: formal request for discovery 
L2-16-98 Warrant recalled on: December 16, 1998 Warrant num: 972036710 
Recall reason: Warrant recalled defendant booked/PTS 
L2-16-98 Filed: PRETRIAL RELEASE 
12-18-98 Law & Motion Cancelled. 
32-03-99 CONT OF PRELIMINARY HEARING scheduled on February 26, 199 9 at 
09:00 AM in Third Floor - W37 with Judge DEVER. 
32-03-99 Minute Entry - Minutes for Preliminary Hearing 






aud rey ] 
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SE NUMBER 971308355 State Felony 
Prosecutor: JONES, ERNEST W. 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): PETERSON, MICHAEL A 
Tape Number: video Tape Count: 9-15-00 
HEARING 
TAPE: video COUNT: 9-15-00 
On record 
Exclusionary rule invoked 
Waive opening statement 
COUNT: 91650 
















Witness for State - Kay Utley Lemon 
COUNT: 11413 0 
Defense cross 
COUNT: 120251 
Witness for State - Chris Atkin 
COUNT: 12 0 814 
Defense cross 
COUNT: 122550 
Witness for State - Susan Hunter 
COUNT: 123248 
Defense cross 
State moves to dism counts 9,10,13,14,15,16,17,18. 
Court grants State's motion 
Due to the unavailability of one of the State's witnesses, court 
orders remainder of preliminary hearing continued to February 26, 
1999 at 9:00 am. 
CONT OF PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 02/26/1999 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - W3 7 
rinted: 03/09/00 14:53:25 Page 8 
CASE NUMBER 971008355 State Felony 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
• 4 50 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
before Judge L. A, DEVER 
02-11-99 Filed: Objection to proposed order audreyj 
02-23-99 Filed: Motion to dismiss fcr failure to comply with the statute 
of limitations audreyj 
02-26-99 Minute Entry - Minutes for Preliminary Hearing audrevj 
Judge: PHILIP K PALMER 
PRESENT 
Clerk: audreyj 
Prosecutor: ER NIE JONES 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MICHAEL A PETERSON 
Video 
Tape Number: VIDEO Tape Count: 9 -10 - 5 6 
HE A RING 
COUNT: 9105? 






Court hears oral ar g ument uii defense motion to dismiss 
Court orders defense to submit a memorandum by 3-12-99, S t n ^ 
respond by 3 - 30-99 
Court will hear argument on 4-2-99 at 9:00 am 
ORAL ARGUMENT ON MO TO DISM is scheduled. 
.Date: 04/02/1999 
. Time: 09:0 0 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor • W3 7 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
before Judge L. A. DEVER 
32-26-99 ORAL ARGUMENT ON MO TO DISM sci ledulea -JJJ at 
09:00 AM, in Third Floor - W37 with Juc - audreyj 
3 3-03-99 COPY FEE Payment Received: 1 leeannh 
3 3-03-99 Fee Account cr eated Total Due: ^.uu leeannh 
33-15-99 Filed: supplemental memorandum in suppers t motion :: i: -- ~-
fox failure to comply with the statute of limitations debbiep 
33-29-99 Filed: Memorandum in opposition to deft's motion to dismiss for 
failure to comply with the statute of limitations. audreyj 
34-02-99 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOTION TO DISMISS audreyj 
Ji idge: PHILIP K PALMER 
D2 * - : 5 Page 9 
SE NUMBER 971008355 State Felony 
PRESENT 
Clerk: audreyj 
Prosecutor: JONES, ERNEST W. 
Defendant 
Video 
Tape Number: video Tape Count: 9-20-00 
HEARING 
Court hears oral argument and denies defense motion to dismiss. 
COUNT: 94656 
Defense closing argument on preliminary hearing 
COUNT: 95808 
State rebuttal argument 
COUNT: 100335 
Court finds probable cause to bind defendant over. 
Court recommends that arraigning Judge re-examine defendant on his 
ability to pay attorney fees. 
CASE BOUNDOVER 
Defendant waived preliminary hearing, State consenting thereto. 
This case is bound over. An Arraignment hearing has been set on 
4/16/99 at 10:30 AM in courtroom S44 before Judge FRANK NOEL. 
-02-99 Note: Case Bound Over audreyj 
-02-99 ARRAIGNMENT scheduled on April 16, 1999 at 10:30 AM in Fourth 
Floor - S44 with Judge NOEL. audreyj 
-02-99 Judge NOEL assigned. audreyj 
-16-99 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law & Motion pat] 
Judge: FRANK NOEL 
PRESENT 
Clerk: patj 
Prosecutor: ERNEST W. JONES 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MICHAEL A PETERSON 
Video 
HEARING 
AN AMENDED INFORMATION IS FILED. 
A SCHEDULING CONFERENCE IS SET FOR APRIL 26 AT 8:45 A.M. BEFORE 
JUDGE NOEL 
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 04/26/1999 
Time: 08:45 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - S44 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
rinted: 03/09/00 14:53:28 Page 10 
CASE NUMBER 371303355 State Felony 
SL- :, UT 84113 1860 
before Judge FRANK NOEL 
04-16-99 Filed: AMENDED INFORMATION pat] 
04-19-99 Tracking started for Exhibit. Review date Jul 02, 1999. susies 
04-28-99 Minute Entry - Minutes for SCHEDULING CONFERENCE pat] 
Judge: FRANK NOEL 
PRESENT 
Clerk: patj 
Prosecutor: JOHN JOHNSON 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MICHAE1 A PETER SON 
Video 
Tape Number: TIME T i p ^ nr>\\r\t w n 
HEARING 
MICHAEL PETERSON STATES THAT HE HAS MANY MOTIONS TO FILE ON THIS 
CASE AND THAT HE WONT BE A BI .E TO HAVE THEM ALL FILED BEFORE THE 
NEXT 6 0 DAYS. 
THE COURT REFERS THIS CASE TO JUDGE REESE TO BE SET ON HIS 
CALENDAR. 
OS-14-99 Note: REESE/MD C, O CAs- SET FOR SCHEDULING CONFERENCE marlenec 
05-17-99 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE scheduled on June 04, 1999 at 09:00 AM in 
Third Floor - S32 with Judge REESE marlenec 
05-] 7 99 Notice - NOTICE for Case 971008355 H •'< Ht marlenec 
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 06/04/1999 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - S32 
Third District Court 
4 50 South State 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
Before Judge: ROBIN W REESE 
06-0 1-99 Notice - NOTICE for Case ^" 7 mail-ned 
HEARING is scheduled 
Date: 07/12/1 " • 
Time: 02 :00 p. ... 






Third District Cou 
4 50 -South Stare 
r -4111-136 
Judge .-_bIN W REESE 
Entry M m u r ^ ~ ^ ""-
FR ANK NOEL 
marlened 
Prosecutor: ERNEST W JONES 
Defendant 
36-04-99 inur -  marlened 
Printed: 03/09/00 14:53:30 Page 11 
3E NUMBER 9710:3355 State Felony 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MICHAEL A PETERSON 




C/0 CASE SET JURY TRIAL 
C/O DEFT'S MOTION TO BE SUBMITTED BY 7/30/99 
C/O CASE SET FOR HEARING TO DETERMINE IF DEFT QUALIFIES FOR LDA 
HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 07/12/1999 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: Third Floor - S32 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
before Judge ROBIN W REESE 
JURY TRIAL. 
Date: 09/13/1999 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - S32 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
before Judge ROBIN W REESE 
JURY TRIAL. 
Date: 09/14/1999 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - S32 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
before Judge ROBIN W REESE 
JURY TRIAL. 
Date: 09/15/1999 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - S32 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
before Judge ROBIN W REESE 
•04-99 HEARING scheduled on July 12, 1999 at 02:00 PM in Third Floor -
S32 with Judge REESE. marlened 
•04-99 Notice - NOTICE for Case 971008355 ID 352872 marlened 
JURY TRIAL is scheduled. 
inted: 03/09/00 14:53:31 Page 12 
ZAS E NUM3 ER 9 713 0 3 3 5 5 51ate r e1o r i y 
Date: 
Date: 0 9 '13, '19 9 9 
Time: 0 9 : 0 0 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - S32 
Third District Coi irt 
4 50 South State 
SLC, UT 84111 -I860 
before Judge ROBIN W REESE 
36-04-99 JURY TRIAL scheduled on September 1! 3 1999 at 09:00 A M i i i Third 
Floor - S32 with Judge REESE. marlened 
)6-04-99 JURY TRIAL scheduled on September ] ! 1 999 « i\ 0 9 1 1) i VI I i , I hird 
Floor - S32 with Judge REESE. marlened 
)6-04 -99 Notice - NOTICE for Case 971008355 ID 352894 marlened 
JURY TRIAL is scheduled. 
Date: 
Date : 
) 6 0 4 9 9 JURY TR I AL s c he du 1 e d o i i S e p t e rnb e r: 1! 5 1 9 9 9 a t 0 9 : 0 0 i M I :i n ' r h i r d 
Floor - S32 with Judge REESE. marlened 
)6-04-99 Notice - NOTICE for Case 971008355 ID 352895 marlened 
JURY TRIAL is scheduled. 
Date: 
Date: 
)6-04-99 Note: SCH i i tinutes i nodified. marlened 
)6-07-99 Note: SCH minutes modified. marlened 
)6-08-99 Filed order: Order regarding statute of limitations audreyj 
Judge ppalmer 
Signed June 08,, 19 9 9 
16-21-99 Note: FILED DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO THE STATE'S ORDER 
REGARDING STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, FILING DATE AND DOUBLE 
JEOPARDY - MCIHAEL A PETERSON patd 
(7-06-99 Judge REESE assigr- ' pacj 
17-12-99 Minute Entry - Minutes for HEARING patd 
Judge: ROBIN W REESE 
PRESENT 
Clerk: patd 
Prosecutor: SIM GILL FOR ERNIE JONES 
Defendant 
Video 
Tape Number: 3 53 53 
HEARING 
C/O CONFEr-iN^z. ..^. . . i: . : JK /-ii-r --. = .... .:..,- r . ^ J i i - L , 
MOTION ON INDIGENCY IETERMINATION 
MOTION INDIGENCY DETERMINATE is scheduled. 
Date: 07/26/1999 ' ' 
Time: 0 2:00p.m. 
Location: Third Floor - S32 
Tinted: 03/09/00 14:53:33 Page 13 
\SE NUMBER 971003355 State Felony 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
Before Judge: ROBIN W REESE 
7-12-99 MOTION INDIGENCY DETERMINATI scheduled on July 26, 1999 at 
02:00 PM in Third Floor - S32 with Judge REESE. 
7-13-99 Filed: APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL - REBECCA HYDE 
7-26-99 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOTION INDEGENCY DETERMINATI 
Judge: ROBIN W REESE 
PRESENT 
Clerk: marlened 
Prosecutor: ERNIE JONES 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MICHAEL A PETERSON 
Video 
Tape Number: TAPE Tape Count: 2:31 
HEARING 
C/O MIKE PETERSON, COUNSEL FOR DEFT MOTION TO WITHDRAW / C/O 
MOTION GRANTED 
STATE WITNESSES-
CARLYN HINMAN SW Sc EX 
JAMES B. MEDLIN SW & EX 
RICHARD F NORRIS SW & EX 
COURT FINDS DEFT INDIGENT / DEFT TO BE APPOINTED CONFLICT COUNSEL 
C/O CONTINUE FOR SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 08/13/1999 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: Third Floor - S32 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
Before Judge: ROBIN W REESE 
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE. 
Date: 8/13/99 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: Third Floor - S32 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
before Judge ROBIN W REESE 
7-26-99 Notice - NOTICE for Case 971008355 ID 387658 marlened 






'rinted: 03/09/00 14:53:34 Page 14 






0 • ; 2 6 - 9 9 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: Third Floor - S32 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 













scheduled on August: 
in Third Floor - S32 with Judge REESE' 
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE scheduled on August 
in Third Floor - S32 with Judge REESE. 
1 3 ] 99 9 at: 0 2 : 0 0 PM 
13, 1999 at 0 2:0 0 PM 
Minutes for 
W REESE 




Prosecutor; ERNEST \ 1 J ONES 
Defendant 





Tape Number: TAPE Tape Count: 2:.] 7 
HEARING 
cv o ALI , i i : i i : i is i o B E FILED B Y 9/20/99 
C/O CA. I E ' : I I, PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE A ND II TRY TRIAI , 
PRETRIAL :0NFERENCE is scheduled, 
Date: 11/08/1999 
Time: 10:30 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - S32 
Third District Court 
450 South State . . 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
Before Judge: ROB.IN W REESE 
JURY TRIAL 
Date: 11/17/1999 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location Third Floor - S32 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84111-1360 
POBTN w REESE 
JURY 
Laze 
Printed: 03/09/00 14:53:35 'Page 15 
3E NUMBER 971008355 State Felony 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: 
Before Judge 
Third Floor - S32 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 




























Third Floor - S32 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
ROBIN W REESE 
CONFERENCE scheduled on November 
Floor - S32 with Judge REESE. 
08, 1999 at 10:30 AM 
JURY TRIAL scheduled on November 17, 1999 at 09:00 AM in Third 
Floor - S32 with Judge REESE. 
JURY TRIAL scheduled on November 18, 1999 at 09:00 AM in Third 
Floor - S32 with Judge REESE. 
JURY TRIAL scheduled on November 19, 1999 at 09:00 AM in Third 
Floor - S32 with Judge REESE. 
Filed: Response to Request for Discovery 
Filed: Motion FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE MOTIONS 
Filed order: ORDER EXTENDING TIME TO FILE MOTIONS 
Judge rreese 
Signed October 04, 1999 
MOTIONS HEARING scheduled on October 21, 1999 at 02:00 PM in 
Third Floor - S32 with Judge REESE. 
Filed: SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
Filed: Motion TO STRIKE EXPUNGED RECORD 
Filed: Motion FOR HEARING RE: DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO THE 
STATE'S ORDER REGARDING STATUE OF LIMITATIONS, FILING DATE AND 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
Note: REESE/MD C/O CASE SET FOR MOTIONS HEARING 
Filed: Motion TO APPOINT SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL AND STAY 
PROCEEDINGS 
Filed: AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO APPOINT SUBSTITUTE 
COUNSEL AND STAY PROCEEDINGS 
Filed: STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
EXPUNGEMENT RECORDS 
Filed: STATE'S MEMEORANDUM 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO 
Entry - Minutes for 






REGARDING STATUTE OF LIMITATION 




















m a r l e n e d 
P r o s e c u t o r : ERNEST JONES 
r i n t e d : 0 3 / 0 9 / 0 0 1 4 : 5 3 : 3 6 Page 16 
CASE NUMBER 9710033 55 State Felony 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GREG SKORDAS 
Video 
T a p e Ni imber : TA P E " I '« ij = I' : i i : H 2 • 3 9 
HEARING 
DEFT'8 MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL C, 0 MOTION DENIED 
DEFT'S MOTION TO DISMISS / C/O DENIED 
DEFT'S MOTION MOTION NOT TO OPEN EXPUNGED RECORD '.' - MC'TI-N T"' 
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE DENIED 
DEFT'S MOTION SUPPLEMENT S TA < C/ 0 MOTION 3RANTED FOR DECLARATION . 
DOC 
11-02-99 Filed: ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS DEFENSE COUNSEL marlene< 
11-02-99 Filed: ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON THE STATUE OF 
LIMITATIONS marlenec 
11-02-99 Filed: ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO EXPUNGE RECORDS marlenec 
11-02-99 Filed: ORDER GRANTING DISCOVERY REQUEST marlenec 
1 1 -] 7-99 Minute Entry - Minutes for • Ji iry Trial marlenec 
Judge: -OB IN A*. REESE 
PRESENT 
Clerk: rra:.r-..T 
Prosecutor: E.-\'E ' " W JONES 
Defendant 
Defendant ' . y (. • i] 3R E- 3 SKORDA S 
Video 
T-"*-* \
 r ; TAF'K '|'ll): , ' , | > . 
Court aa^.ses defendant of rights and penalties. 
A pre-sentence investigation was ordered, 
The Judge orders Adult Probation & Parole to prepare a Pre-sentence 
report. 
TRIAL 
DEFT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER MOTIONS 
C/O MOTION DENIED 
DEFT'S MOTION TO CONTINUE TO HIRE DAVID GRINDSTAFF 
C/O MOTION DENIED 
ON STATE MOTION, • I'S 2 1 I I IROUGH 1 2 DISMISSED 
/-"»/•% f in Tt-n i i ii ' -
\~\J]JLH 1 O I. " " r « " 
SENTENCING is o w . -
Date: 01/03/7*"" 
Time: 02-
Locat : T« * _w-w_ • ^32 
; District Court 
• 450 South State 
Printed: 03,/09/00 14-53:37 Page 17 
SE NUMBER 971003355 State Felony 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
Before Judge: ROBIN W. REESE 
•17-99 SENTENCING scheduled on January 03, 2000 at 02:00 PM in Third 
Floor - S32 with Judge REESE. marlened 
-23-99 Filed: LETTER FROM DEFT marlened 
•24-99 Filed: LETTER FROM DEFT marlened 
-01-99 Filed: Motion TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA AND REQUEST FOR THE 
APPOINTMENT OF SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL marlened 
-15-99 Filed: SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA AND REQUEST 
FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL marlened 
•16-99 Fee Account created Total Due: 15.00 ]oycer 
•16-99 VIDEO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 15.00 joycer 
•22-99 Filed: MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
GUILTY PLEA AND REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF NEW COUNSEL marlened 
•29-99 Filed: Letter from Court of Appeals.- Order - 991076-ca -
Petition for extraordinary relief is denied sophieo 
•03-00 Filed: Notice of Decision - no record/decision has been issued. 
No decision attached to Notice of Decision. kathys 
•03-00 Filed: Transcript of hearing on 11/17/99 annedl 
•03-00 Minute Entry - Minutes for SENTENCING marlened 
Judge: ROBIN W. REESE 
PRESENT 
Clerk: marlened 
Prosecutor: ERNEST W. JONES 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s) : GREG SKORDAS 
Video 
Tape Number: TAPE Tape Count: 2:11 
HEARING 
C/O CASE SCHEDULED FOR MOTION AND PETITION 
STATE TO REPLY BY 1/20/2000 
DEFT TO REPLY BY 2/7/2000 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 3rd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 3rd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
ringed: 03/09/00 14:53:38 Page 18 
IASE NUMBER 3 71 Z C S 3 S 5 S t atie Fe I :;i 1 y 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
C • 0 EACH i:1' DUNT I1 D" 1 1 J I I 2 ONSEC! JTIVE 
SENTENCE FINE 
Chan ge ti It 






















$10000 0 0 
$0 
$4 5 94.6 0 
$10000.00 
Plus Interest 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Restitution i Pay i n behalf of: FULL PES'* Tl .N 
) l - 0 3 -
J l - 0 3 
) l - 0 3 
- 0 0 
- 0 0 
- 0 0 
)l-18-00 
The amount of Adult Probation & Parole 
The amount of Restitution is stii 1 to be determined. 
Pay fine to The Court. 
MOTION & PETITION HEARING is scheduled. 
Date; 02/14/2000 
Time: 09:00 a nil 
Location: Third Floor - S32 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLClf UT 84111-1860 
Before Judge: ROBIN W. REESE 
MOTION Sc PETITION HEARING scheduled on February 14, 2 000 at 
09:00 AM in Third Floor - S32 with Judge REESE. 
Filed: APPLICATION FOR CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE -
Filed: MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING DEFT'S APPLICATION FOR CERTIFICA' 
OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
Filed: MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S APPLICATION F. 






Printed: 03/0 9/0 0 2 4 : 5 3:38 P age 19 
NUMBER 37::: 33 55 State Felony 
28-00 Tracking ended for Exhibit. rr.arler.e 
31-00 Filed: NOTICE OF APPEAL marlened 
)7-00 Filed: Transcript of hearing on 1/3/00 annedl 
.4-00 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOTION & PETITION HEARING marlened 
Judge: ROBIN W. REESE 
PRESENT 
Clerk: marlened 
Prosecutor: ERNEST JONES 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): KARLYNN HINMAN 
Video 
Tape Number: TAPE Tape Count: 9:31 
HEARING 
DEFT MOTION FOR APPLICATION FOR CERTIFICATE FOR PROBABLE CAUSE 
COURT FINDS DEFT HAS NOT SHOW EVIDENCE HAS NOT MET BURDEN - C/O 
DENIED 
DEFT MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA 
C/O MOTION DENIED 




NOTICE OF APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL - M. KARLYNN HINMAN marlened 
NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS OF COUNSEL marlened 
NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH WITHDRAWAL OF PRIOR NOTICE OF 
APPEAR marlened 
6-00 Filed order: ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE marlened 
Judge rreese 
Signed March 06, 2000 
ted: 03/09/00 ".4:53:39 Page 20 (last) 
Addendum C 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
ERNEST W. JONES, 1736 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION O 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 







Screened by: E. Jones 
Assigned to: E Jones 
BAIL: $150,000.00 
Warrant/Release: Non-Jail 
I N F O R M A T I O N 
o.J?7100»srF8 
The undersigned Brook Plotnick - West Valley City Police Department, under oath states 
on information and belief that the defendant, committed the crimes of: 
COUNTI 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Joan Mattson money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
00189 
INFORMATION 




COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 19S3, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense,'devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Joan Mattson money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses,, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNTffl 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Mike Mabry money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT IV 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Mike Mabry money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00. 
00190 
INFORMATION 




COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Utley money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions,.and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT VI 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 .West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Utley money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT VH 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F, NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Chris Atkin money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00. 
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COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Chris Atkin money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT DC 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Randy Hunter money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNTX 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Randy Hunter money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 19S3, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Joy Slotsvic money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT xn 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 .West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 19S3, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Joy Slotsvic money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT xm 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Lemmon money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Lemmon money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT XV 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Sherry Francis money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT XVI 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Sherry Francis money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 19S3, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Sherry Bailey money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT xvm 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Sherry Bailey money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT xvnn 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Sue Hunter money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Sue Hunter money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud,, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Officer Brook Plotnick, S. Humphrey, B. Gessel, Joan Mattson, Sue Hunter, Kay Crosby, 
Mike Mabry, L. Staufifer, Kay Utley, S. Francis, O. Fowler, K. Noland, D. Duffin and S. 
Lebaron. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your Affiant bases this Information on police report #94-25376 and the following: 
1. During the Spring of 1993, the defendant ran an advertisement in the newspaper. 
The ad made certain promises and representations to those responding concerning employment 
and salary. Numerous people responded to the ad and met with the defendant The defendant 
had each person sign an agreement with him. The defendant did not deliver as promised The 
defendant then sued each person for over $1,000.00 and obtained judgments against many of 
these people. 
2. The defendant told several employees at his business that he never intended to 
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fulfill any of the promises in the ad. The defendant back dated checks and altered records to 
cover up this scheme. 
Authorized for presentment and filing: 
E. NEAL GUNNARSONjJ^istrict Attorney 







day of May, 
and sworn t04&bH'£fe3his '• 
, 1 9 9 7 . / ^ ^ C V " 
MAGISTRATE \ 5 . /«••*-.. 
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Data Table for Initial Criminal Filing 
Prosecuting governmental entity: Salt Lake County 
Prior related cases: none 
Officer's Badge No. 8049 
Agency Case Number 94-25376 
Arrest Date: 
Jail Booking Number 
Defendant's Sex: Male 
Defendant's Social Security Number 
Defendant's Driver's License Number 8223961 
State Issuing Defendant's Driver's License: Utah 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
ERNEST W.JONES, 1736 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801-363-7900 
riLcu ifi« ^ t i wuwm 
Third Jud W District 
APR 16 1999 
8ALT LAKE COUNTY $£ OtputyCtoifc 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
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Case No. 971008355FS 
The undersigned Ernest W. Jones, Deputy District Attorney, under oath states on 
information and belief that the defendant committed the crime of: 
COUNTI 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Joan Mattson money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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COUNT II 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Joan Mattson money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT III 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain Mike Mabry money or anything of value by means of false 
of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT IV 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Mike Mabry money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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COUNT V 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Utley money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT VI 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Utley money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT VII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Chris Atkin money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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COUNT VIII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Chris Atkin money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT IX 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Joy Slotsvic money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNTX 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Joy Slotsvic money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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COUNT XI 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Sue Hunter money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT XII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Sue Hunter money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Officer Brook Plotnick, Officer Steve Humphrey, B. Gessel, Joan Mattson, Sue Hunter, 
Kay Crosby, Mike Mabry, L. Stauffer, Kay Utley, S. Francis, O. Fowler, K. Noland, D. 
Duffm and S. Labaron. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiant bases this Information on police report no. 94-25376 and the following: 
1. During the spring of 1993, the defendant ran an advertisment in the newspaper. 
The ad made certain promises and representations to those responding concerning employment 
and salary. Numerous people responded to the ad and met with the defendant. The defendant 
had each person sign an agreement with him. The defendant did not deliver as promised. The 
defendant then sued each person for over $1,000.00 and obtaine djudgments against many of 
these people. 
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2. The defendant told several employees at his business that he never intended to 
fulfill any of the promises in the ad. The defendant back dated checks and altered records to 
cover up this scheme. 
Authorized for presentment and filing: 
DAVID E. YOCOM, District Attorney 
>fr 
:t Attpm 
< ? ~ * ^ - l 
Deputy District ttprney 
amended April 5,1999 
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ERNESf W. JONES 
Affiant 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
ERNEST W. JONES, 1736 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 





ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
DISMISS DEFENSE COUNSEL 
Case No. 971008355FS 
Honorable Robin W. Reese 
The defendant's Motion to Recuse his Attorney, Gregory G. Skordas, came on for 
hearing on October 21, 1999 before the Honorable Robin W. Reese. The defendant was present 
and represented by Gregory G. Skordas. The State was represented by Ernest W. Jones, Deputy 
District Attorney. The Court having heard the arguments of counsel and having reviewed the 
memorandums of law submitted by both parties, enters the following order: 
1. There is no genuine conflict of interest between the defendant and his court 
appointed attorney. 
2. There is no evidence that the court appointed attorney engaged in any retaliation 
against the defendant 
3. The defendant's court appointed attorney has only a professional relationship with 
the prosecutor in this case. There is no evidence of a social relationship between defendant's 
court appointed attorney and the prosecutor. 
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4. The strategy of the court appointed attorney may differ from the defendant's 
strategy at trial. The defense attorney should consult with the defendant but the parties may 
disagree on strategy and defenses. 
The court appointed attorney is prepared and able to assist the defendant at trial. 
The court appointed attorney is effective and capable. 
The defendant has had the assistance of two different court appointed attorneys in 
The defendant's Motion to Recuse his Attorney is denied. 








10. Any issues concerning vindictive prosecution or bad faith are not issues for the 
jury to consider in this case. 
DATED this day of , 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
ROBIN W. REESE 
Third District Court Judge 
Gregory G. Skordas 
Counsel for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and conect copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion To 
Dismiss Defense Counsel was delivered to Gregory G. Skordas, Counsel for Defendant 
RICHARD NORRIS, at Suite 810 Boston Building, 9 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 
. -r ft**' 
84111 on the £ ^ 1 ^f of Neveffiber, 1999. 
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Entry of Plea 
Electronically recorded on 
November 17, 1999 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE ROBIN W. REESE 
Third District Court Judge 
APPEARANCES; 
For the State: 
For the Defendant: 
ERNIE JONES 
District Atty's Office 
231 East 400 South 
Suite 300 




111 East Broadway 
Suite 800 
SLC, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)530-1500 
Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe, RPR/CSR/CCT 
1641 South 350 West 
Orem, Utah 84057 F I L E D 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 225-02Utth Court of Appeals 
Pauiette Stagg 
Clark of the Court 
01n^R 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on November 17, 1999) 
THE COURT: The matter that's set for trial 
today is State versus Richard Norris. For the record, 
Mr. Norris is present with his attorney, and the State 
is represented. Counsel, before we do anything else, 
we should address briefly the motion to reconsider 
filed by Mr. Norris pro se. Does the State have a 
copy of that? 
MR. JONES: I do, Judge. 
THE COURT: Counsel for the State, did you 
want to respond or — 
MR. JONES: Well, it just seems to me that 
he's rehashing a lot of things that we argued back in 
October, and I would just — 
THE COURT: Sit down, Mr. Norris. 
MR. JONES: — ask the Court to deny the 
request at this time. As you know, this case came 
back from the Supreme Court in October of last year. 
We did a prelim in February. He's gone through at 
least two different attorneys, and I just think he's 
had sufficient time to prepare. I think there's no 
harm if Mr. Skordas stays onboard. He's prepared, 
we're ready to go forward. Like I say, we've argued 
this issue about a month ago, and I just don't see 
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anytning new in the motion with the latest one that 
he's filed on the 15th of November that's any different 
than the one — other than it's a lot longer — that 
was filed back in October of 1999. 
THE COURT: Well, I think there are a couple 
of things that may be new. One is that Mr. Skordas 
was part of the district attorney's office when the 
charges were filed against Mr. Norris. I think that's 
paragraph No. 6, which — 
MR. JONES: And maybe I could just address 
that, if you want. 
THE COURT: There was one other I was going 
to mention. That is that — well, No. 8, Mr. Skordas 
personally and substantially played a role in the 
decision of the District Attorney's Office to file 
charges against Mr. Norris. 
Let's see, Mr. Skordas is a personal friend 
of Mr. Yocom's, who of course now is the district 
attorney, and paragraph 13, Mr. Skordas received a 
conflict attorney contract, which he has today and 
under which he represents Mr. Norris, or by virtue 
of which he represents Mr. Norris through Mr. Yccom. 
That Mr. Yocom somehow was instrumental in having 
Mr. Skordas appointed to this contract, or having a 
contract left to Mr. Skordas. So why don't you go 
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ahead and discuss those. Then I'll give Counsel a 
chance to respond to Mr. Norris. 
MR. JONES: Well, it's my understanding that 
Mr. Skordas was not even working in our office when 
we filed these charges. These charges were filed I 
believe in October of 1996, and Mr. Skordas had left 
the office at the time we filed. He had no input at 
all into the decision to file these criminal charges. 
So he didn't have anything to do with the decision 
whether to file or not to file. 
I don't know. I guess he is friends with 
Mr. Yocom, who is the district attorney, but again, 
he wasn't in the office at the time the charges were 
filed. So I don't know that it makes much difference 
whether they're friends or no. In fact, Mr. Yocom 
never had any input into the decision to file charges 
in this case. 
THE COURT: What, was Mr. Yocom acting as the 
district attorney when these charges were filed? 
MR. JONES: I don't remember when he was in 
that — he was the county attorney for a period of 
time. Then he lost the election for four years, and 
then he came back I think last year. 
THE COURT: He was elected, if my memory 
serves, and Counsel, you can correct me, but his 
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1 election was in November of '98. His term began 
2 January of '99. 
3 MR. JONES: Right. So in October of '96 when 
4 we decided to file these charges, he wouldn't have 
5 even been the district attorney or the county attorney 
6 at that time. 
7 The last issue, my understanding is that 
8 although Mr. Skordas may have a conflict counsel 
9 appointment, that the decision as to who is hired or 
10 who is appointed to represent a defendant is made by 
11 the Court, I thought. 
12 Now, I remember we argued whether or not 
13 Mr. Peterson should be taken off the case, and the 
14 decision was made by the Court to take him off. We 
15 had no input, our office, the district attorney's 
16 office had no input into the decision as to who would 
17 be appointed to represent the defendant in this case. 
18 So I don't know that we have any input at all as far 
19 as who was hired to represent the defendant. 
20 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Skordas, anything 
21 further that you'd like to say? I know this wasn't 
22 your motion, strictly speaking. It was filed by 
23 Mr. Norris pro se, but you are Mr. Norris' attorney. 
24 MR. SKORDAS: Well, ]ust very briefly. I was 
25 employed by the district attorney's office during and 
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until the end of 1994. The '94 election when Dave 
lost the election, I left. After that, I've been in 
private practice since. 
I just want to represent to the Court that 
I had never heard of Mr. Norris until I was appointed 
on this case. I certainly never talked to Mr. Jones 
while I was at the district attorney's office, or 
anyone else about filing or not filing against any 
individuals that were involved in this case. In terms 
of declamation, or investigation, or the charging 
decision, I was not involved in that in any respect. 
I am a friend of Mr. Yocom's, I suppose, 
and I would allege, your Honor, that I am a personal 
friend of his. I've worked with him before, and I 
continue to associate with him, although somewhat 
rarely. 
I also — I mean, I guess I've answered some 
of the questions here. The other one would be the 
conflict contract itself. I think I can indicate I 
have some personal information there, because the 
conflict contract is left through Legal Defender' s 
Association, but those who are appointed to that 
contract are appointed by a panel made up of the 
presiding judge of the district court, the associate 
presiding judge, which I am, a member of the defense 
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1 legal community — in this case I believe it was Ron 
2 Yengich who represented the defense attorneys -- and 
3 one of the other judges of the district court, Judge 
4 Lewis. 
5 The district attorney has no involvement, 
6 no selection at all, no input at all to whom that 
7 contract is left, and I think we actually received 
8 that contract, interviewed for it before Mr. Yocom 
9 was elected district attorney. It would have been a 
10 year ago right now, I think. 
11 THE COURT: Before he was elected, before he 
12 took office? 
13 MR. JONES: Before he took office. 
14 THE COURT: Mr. N o m s , anything further? 
15 MR. NORRIS: No. 
16 THE COURT: The idea that he won't — that 
17 Mr. Skordas won't bring the motions you think that he 
18 should and those things, we've already that. I'm not 
19 going to go back over all that old ground, but the new 
20 parts of this motion to reconsider, is there anything 
21 else you'd like to say? 
22 MR. NORRIS: It was again my understanding, 
23 based on representation that Mr. Skordas has made, 
24 that the contract attorney did come through Neil 
25 Gunderson through Mr. Yocom. 
1 THE COURT: Yeah, has nothing to do witn it. 
2 MR. NORRIS: Okay, and the other point is, 
of course, that Mr. Yocom, as well as Mr. Jones, is a 
4 named defendant in a federal civil case, and I think 
5 based on that, there is a divided -- or, you know, a 
6 diluted loyalty of Mr. Skordas being able to represent 
7 me. So I don't know that because of the friendship, 
8 because he was a major campaign contributor in this 
9 last election, a former law partner and such, that the 
10 outcome of this trial would have a significant bearing 
11 on the federal civil rights case. 
12 So based on that I think that Mr. Skordas 
13 should recuse himself, you know, just from an ethical 
14 standpoint, but further than that I think that he is 
15 required to. I believe it's Rule 1.11 it talks about 
16 in the Utah Code of Professional Conduct, specifically 
17 states that if a government attorney has personal and 
18 substantial involvement and that, that they cannot 
19 (inaudible) government go into private practice 
20 representing a private citizen. 
21 THE COURT: Well, what have you heard today 
22 or what evidence do you have that Mr. Skordas was 
23 substantially involved in your prosecution or the 
24 charges that have been brought against you before he 
25 left a government office? 
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Mr. Jones, who's been prosecuting attorney 
since the beginning said he had none. Mr. Skordas 
said he had none. Never even heard of you until he 
was appointed to represent you. So you make that 
statement, Mr. Norris. What evidence do you have --
MR. NORRIS: Based on what Mr. Skordas has 
said in the past and that is contrary to what he 
represented to the Court here today. Also, I think 
it's contrary representation on Mr. Jones' memory of 
when Mr. Skordas left. I think Mr. Skordas did say 
that he was employed through the end of '94 in that. 
I think, your Honor, that in all fairness 
and that, that I should be allowed to do some kind 
of discovery. Just to take, you know, proffer of 
these two individuals when there is a conflict here, 
I don't think is fair when I have chance — and I 
ought to have a chance to do some discovery and be 
able to verify some of the things they are saying. 
You know, it's very difficult to prove a 
point and such without being able to do some discovery 
and get into the Salt Lake County District Attorney's 
Office records, and find out exactly what Mr. Skordas' 
involvement was. Just to shoot from the hip and for 
him to deny everything puts me at a great disadvantage 
without being able to do some discovery. 
-9-
1 THE COURT: I've heard all those parties 
2 concerned respond. We have heard this motion in some 
3 more detail before today. There doesn't appear to 
4 me to be anything new represented by this motion to 
5 reconsider that would warrant a reconsideration. 
6 The allegation that somehow Mr. Skordas, 
7 being a friend of Mr. Yocom, who is a defendant in 
8 a civil suit that you brought, Mr. Norris, not this 
9 lawsuit, but in a civil suit, and that because of 
10 that friendship he may not want you to prosper in 
11 this case, there's just no basis for that. It's not 
12 the same case at all. 
13 If the fact that Mr. Skordas was a friend of 
14 Mr. Yocom created a conflict of interest, Mr. Skordas 
15 couldn't represent anyone charged by the Salt Lake 
16 County District Attorney's Office. There just doesn't 
17 seem to be any basis for that. There's no evidence. 
18 If there were some, you would certainly have 
19 had a chance by now to bring it forward. You haven't 
20 presented any. You've simply — from what I hear you 
21 saying, you just want more time to look into it, and 
22 unfortunately today's the date and time set for trial. 
23 We have about 27 people who are waiting to try this 
24 case as potential jurors. So I'll deny the motion to 
25 reconsider and we'll proceed with trial today. 
-10-
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THE COURT: okay. And the motions and 
reply - the memoranda in support of and against the 
motion to withdraw the plea are all in the file. I 
assume there is nothing else to be filed there. 
MR. JONES: This is on just the 
certificate of probable cause, right? 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. JONES: And then on the 14th of 
February we are going to argue both motions, I 
guess? 
THE COURT: Correct 
MR. JONES: Okay. 
THE COURT: The petition and the motion. 
MS. HINMAN: Your Honor, I am in somewhat 
of an awkward situation in terms of notice of appeal 
obviously with this motion pending. I didn't think 
that would be more than 30 days. I would assume that 
I will not lose any time by filing the notice of 
appeal because of my doing that. I'll have -
THE COURT: That's something you will 
i have to look into, unfortunately. 
> MS. HINMAN: And I need - Your Honor, 
\ just to give you a heads up, I will probably file a 
\ notice of appeal while (Inaudible) jurisdictional 
? aspect of it and then ask the Court to either - I 
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assume - well, whichever court it goes to - to stay 
i the appeal or do something of that sort so that we 
\ don't lose anything (Inaudible) -
\ THE COURT: okay, that will be your 
5 option. 
> MS. HINMAN: (Inaudible) somewhat -
THE COURT: Okay. 
i MS. HINMAN: (Inaudible). 
> MR. SKORDAS: I think the rule is pretty 
) clear, she's got to file a motion of appeal -
MS. HINMAN: I think I need to file it. 
: And I don't want to do that as an insult to this 
) Court. 
\ THE COURT: It is not an insult. No, no 
i problem. I understand. Mr. Norris reserved his 
) right to appeal, and I expected that would happen, so 
7
 it's certainly not an insult, 
i MS. HINMAN: Well, I come from the old 
> school that you don't leave stones unturned. That 
) was my initial training, so -
THE COURT: No insult, no problem at 
\ all. 
i All right. We'll see you back on the 
i 14th. 
THE DEFENDANT: Judge Reese, I was going 
1 to ask if the Court would rule on the attorney, 
2 substitute of counsel, to help me with my motion to 
3 withdraw. I am not going to have access if I'm 
4 incarcerated to--
5 THE COURT: Why can't Ms. Hinman 
6 represent you on that and we'll let Mr. Skordas 
7 withdraw? Is that a problem? You got an attorney to 
8 represent you on appeal. 
9 THE DEFENDANT: Well, let me explain the 
10 situation, Your Honor. Maybe Ms. Hinman can explain 
11 the financial -
12 THE COURT: what about Mr. Grindstaff, 
13 you've apparently retained his services and wanted to 
14 postpone the trial so that he could represent you, 
15 so --
16 THE DEFENDANT: The amount that I was 
17 going to pay him and the amount of time that we 
18 thought we could get this dismissed on some pretrial 
19 motions is a long shot from what the cost of an 
20 appeal is as well as what the cost to withdraw a plea 
21 would be. 
22 THE COURT: Well, most of those documents 
23 have been filed. No, Mr. Norris, I won't remove 
24 Mr. Skordas. There is just no grounds to do it at 
25 least from what I've been able to tell so far. There 
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1 is no conflict that -- real or - or apparent -
2 THE DEFENDANT: But you don't think there 
3 is a conflict when I am going to file based on 
4 ineffective assistance of counsel and that 
5 Mr. Skordas should have to go in through his own 
6 incompetence? 
7 THE COURT: Those are all the appeal 
8 issues. The motion to withdraw the guilty plea, 
9 Mr. Norris, is whether you knowingly and voluntarily 
10 entered a plea. That's independent of all of those 
11 things on - all those other side issues that I know 
12 you'll be appealing. So, no, I won't take 
13 Mr. Skordas off the case. 
14 MS. HINMAN: Your Honor, I guess I need 
15 to say something. I think that there are some very 
16 interesting and significant legal issues that are 
17 ripe for appeal and should be appealed in terms of 
18 interpretation of the statute and several adjunct 
19 kinds of things. 
20 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
21 MS. HINMAN: But I did not assist 
22 Mr. Norris and did not recommend and I don't want to 
23 be involved in the withdrawals of plea. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. 
25 MS, HINMAN I thought that Mr. Skordas 
(LLIEWAY,CCT 801-364-4943 Page 45 - Page 48 
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id worked out a very good plea in that sense, 
pecially reserving the rights to appeal. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MS. HINMAN: My concern with it is that 
e scope of the appeal would be sufficient to cover 
1 of the issues that I felt could be raised, and I 
;lieve that has been pretty well covered. So, I'm 
3t in this business to attack other attorneys. That 
not my intention. I am in this business to fight 
ird on the legal issues and any overlapping factual 
sues that we have. 
I guess Mr. Skordas and I are both caught 
tto a situation which neither one of us feels too 
appy - and I don't know - that's a great legal 
xm, obviously -- with doing the motion to withdraw 
te plea. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MS. HINMAN: I do feel comfortable in 
iking on the appeal because I think that there are 
Dme good issues to raise and some things that the 
pper courts have not looked upon. And that everyone 
> entitled to the most vigorous appellate rights 
lat can be preserved. 
THE COURT: I'm sure you will give 
fiat --
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MS. HINMAN. so, I think Mr. Skordas and 
both are sort of in a dilemma as to what to do with 
-1 don't have any problem representing him on the 
irobable cause statement on whether or not the 
entence should be stayed. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS HINMAN. That's an easy enough one, 
certainly. I think we are both kind of caught on the 
question of what to do about the question to withdraw 
he plea. 
THE COURT: Well, I'll let Mr. Skordas 
jpeak to the motion to withdraw the plea. Mr. Norris 
wanted (Inaudible) some additional memoranda to 
respond to what Mr. Jones had filed. So if Mr. 
Morris chooses to do that, then I will be happy to 
review it; otherwise, I'll base my decision on the 
memoranda that have have been filed already. And 
then depending on how I've ruled, we will hear from 
you on the petition for the certificate. 
MS. HINMAN: All right. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SKORDAS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
And we will be in recess. 
(Hearing adjourned.) 
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ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA 
CaseNo.971008355FS 
Hon. Robin Reese 
The Defendants Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea came on February 14, 2000, at 9:00 
A.M. before the Honorable Robin Reese. The State was represented by Ernie W. Jones, Salt 
Lake County Deputy District Attorney. The Defendant was present and represented by M. 
Karlynn Hinman, Attorney at Law. 
The Court having reviewed the Memorandums of Law submitted by the parties and 
having heard the arguments of counsel now enters the following findings and order: 
1. There is nothing in the transcript, either verbal or written, to support the 
Defendants claim that he was forced or coerced into entering a guilty plea on November 17, 
1999, to Communications Fraud, a Third Degree Felony (two counts). 
2. The Plea Affidavit (statement of Defendant) shows the plea was voluntary. See 
page 2, page 5 (paragraph 17), and page 6 (paragraph 21) of the Plea Affidavit. 
3. Also the Court questioned the Defendant twice verbally to determine if the plea 
was voluntary. See page 36, (lines 1-5) and page 51 (Lines 19-21) of the transcript. 
P15J? 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA 
CaseNo.971008355FS 
Page 2 
4. The Court believes the Defendant understood the consequences of a guilty plea 
and what was involved in such a plea. 
5. The Defendants motion to withdraw his guilty plea is denied. The Defendants 
guilty plea was voluntary and not coerced. 
DATED this 16th day of February, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
ROBIN REESE, District Judge 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA 
CaseNo.971008355FS 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion To 
Withdraw Guilty Plea was delivered to Karlynn Hinman, Attorney for Defendant Richard Norris. 
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Paukette Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
1 They get a trial date stricken and continued, because 
2 Mr. Peterson was permitted to withdraw and we needed 
3 additional time to have Mr. Skordas to get up to 
4 speed. I'm not anxious to do it again. 
5 The other pressing issues, the State's 
6 inability to find any formal declamation of previous 
7 charges, I will just simply accept the proffer of 
8 the State that it couldn't find any such formal 
9 information. There's nothing to produce. There's 
10 nothing to turn over. At least it appears to be 
11 apparent now formally. 
12 Now, the failure to respond to the Bill of 
13 Particulars concerns me a little bit, but I would deny 
14 a motion to continue on those grounds, because number 
15 one, the motion apparently wasn't filed until October 
16 the 29th of this year, which would have been just about 
17 two to three weeks ago; number two, there had been no 
18 attempt to enforce that or request a response to it 
19 prior to today's date, and it would seem to me that 
20 if you were anxious to have that information, Counsel 
21 and Mr. Norris, you should have asked for the State's 
22 response and made some effort to have the Court order 
23 them to comply before today's date. So it's a little 
24 bit late, and I won't postpone the trial for those 
25 reasons. 
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4 KEITH STONEY , AND GIVEN SOME INFORMATION ABOUT A PAST EMPLOYEE THAT 
5 USEE1 TO WORK FOR RICHARD 'NORRIS AS HIS SECRETARY AND THAT SHE MIGHT 
6 POSSIBLY HAVE SOME INFORMATION THAT COULD ASSIST US IN OUR INVESTIG-
7 ATION OF RICHARD NORRIS. THE NAME GIVEN TO ME WAS A «< AY LYNN , CROSS Y;« 
3 
9 I CALLED UP MS, CROSE i AND SE I UP AND APPOINTMENT FOR AN INTERVIEW 
10 WITH HER. AT APPROXIMATELY 1500 HOURS ON 05/25/94 MS. CROSBY MET WITH 
11 MYSELF AND DETECTIVE HUMPHREY'S AT DIVISION FOR AN INTERVIEW, 
i 2 
12 MS- CROSBY STATED THAT SHE WORKED FOR RICHARD NORRIS Ol : rwo SEP™' 
14 ERATE OCCASSIONS, THE jEIR'ST7"'TIMET THAT SHE WORKED-FOR-MRr^QRSTS^AS I*\ 
15 1992*WHEN HE HAD A-COMPANY CALLED "GREAT AMERICAN PUBLISHING MS. 
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16 CROSBY STATED THAT SHE WAS EMPLOYED AS A SECRETARY AT THAT TIME AND 
17 WOULD DO BASIC FILING FOR HIM. MS* CROSBY DESCRIBED THIS BUSINESS AS 
18 A TYPE OF ADVERTISING OR PUBLISHING BUSINESS. AT.-NO^ TIME-J3ID-.M.S 
19 CROSBY'".EVER SEE -ANY' PRINTING 'PRESSES OF ANY TYPE IN-THE' BUSINESS-'. 
2 0 "~'7" 
21 I1 IS CROSBY STATED THAT SHE I/WT" GREA T AMERICAN"PCBUISHTNG- AFTER • 
2 2 ONLY 'A'TWO MONTHS BUT WAS LATER-CALLED BACK BY MR •' NORRIS ' IN-1FEBRUARY OF 
23 1993' TO AGAIN WORK,-F.OR ,HIM-AS A SECRETARY. THIS TIME MR. NORRIS * S BCS-
2 4 INESS- WAS- CALLED •'UAROE;; INTERNATIONAL" . WHEN SHE FIRST WENT TO WORK 
25 FOR LAROE INTERNATIONAL MR-. NORRIS WOULD .HAVE- HER £UT LABELS ON LIQUID 
26 DIET -PRODUCTS SHE'WOULD"THEN PUT THE BOTTLES IN PLASTIC AND''SEAL THEM. 
27 I' ASKED MS. CROSBY WHERE THE DIET-PRODUCTS CAME FROM. MS. CROSBY WAS 
28 NOT SURE AND STATED THAT MR. NORRIS WOULD JUST SHOW* UP WITH'THE UN-
2 9 MARKED BOTTLES IN' HIS 'PICK-UP TRUCK AND THEN BRING THEM INTO THE Bl !S-
3 0 INESS WHERE SHE WOULD LABEL THEM, 
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! MS. CROSBY STATED iHAT MR. NORRIS WOULD THEN toT AN ADVERTISEMENT 
i IN THE PAPER FOR SALES JOBS. THESE ADVERTISEMENTS WOULD PROMISE S140C 
i CC A MONTH SALARY PLUS BENEFITS AND COMMISSIONS. WE ASKED MS. CROSBY 
i HCW MANY PEOFLE RESPONDED TO THE ADVERTISEMENT. MS. CROSBY STATED THA~ 
5 THERE WERE 4 TO 5 HUNDRED PEOPLE THAT RESPONDED IN THE 3 MONTHS THAT 
7 SHI WORKED FOR HIM. WE THEN ASKED WHAT WOULD TRANSPIRE ONCE PEOPLE 
3 SHOWED UP FOR THE EMPLOYMENT. MS. CROSBY STATED THAT MR. NORRIS WOULD 
3 THEN PUT ON A PRESENTATION AND TRY AND SIGN THE PEOPLE UP AS IT WAS 
0 ADVERTISED FOR THE JOB. MR. NORRIS WOULD THEN HAVE THE PEOPLE SIGN 
1. CONTRACTS AND SEND THEM OUT THE DOOR WITH THE DIET PRODUCTS. WE THEN 
2 ASKED IF ANYONE EVER TRIED TO RETURN THE PRODUCTS. SMS.-CROSBY STATED 
3 THAT ALMOST EVERYONE TRIED TO RETURN THE PRODUCTS BUT THAT MR. NORRIS 
4 WOULD NOT ACCEPT "THEM BACK-, MR. NORRIS WOULD TELL THE PEOPLE TO GO 
j HOME AND TRY THE PRODUCTS SO THEY WOULD HAVE FIRST HAND KNOWLEDGE OF 
FindF7 = EkwdF8 = FwdF9=AddF13=DeleteFl2=?revious, 
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46 THE PRODUCT. WHEN*THE PEOPLE WOULD TRY AND RETURN THE PRODUCT MR. NOR-
47 RIS-WOULD TELL THEM THAT THE SEAL ON THE PACKAGING HAD BEEN-BROKENL-AND 
4 8 THAT HE COULD NOT ACCEPT THE PRODUCT BACK FROM THEM FOR SANITATION 
49 REASONS." MS. CROSBY STATED THAT ALOT OF PEOPLE WOULD GET UPSET AND 
50 WOULD JUST LEAVE THE PRODUCT THERE. MR. NORRIS WOULD THEN TAKE THE 
31 RETURNED PRODUCT AND RE-SEAL IT IN A BOX AND REDISTRIBUTE IT TO ANOT-
5 2 HER POTENTIAL~CrTENT. 
53 
54 WE THEN ASKED MS. CROSBY IF SHE EVER KNEW OF ANYONE WHO WAS EVER 
=."> GIVEN A JOB, PAID A SALARY AS PROMISED IN THE ADVERTISEMENT OR GIVEN 
56 ANY BENEFITS OR COMMISSIONS. MS. CROSBY WAS NOT AWARE OF ANYONE IN THE 
57 TIME FRAME THAT SHE WAS EMPLOYED DY MR. NORRIS. MS. CROSBY WAS RESPON-
58 SIBLE FOR THE BUSINESS LEDGERS AND DOES NOT REMEMBER EVER SEEING ANY 
59 MONEY PAID OUT TO ANY EMPLOYEES. MS. CROSBY STATED.THAT SHE FELT AS 
60 THOUGH THE PROGRAM THAT MR. NORRIS WAS RUNNING WAS DISHONEST AND THAT 
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61 MR. NORRIS WOULD JUST GET PEOPLE TO COME IN ON HIS ADVERTISEMENTS AND 
62 THEN HAVE THEM SIGN PAPERS PURCHASING A PRODUCT. MR. NORRIS WOULD TELL 
6 3 THEM ONE THING AND THEN HAVE THEM SIGN ANOTHER. 
6 4 MS. CROSBY ALSO REMEMBERED ONE INCIDENT WHEN MR. NORRIS HAD JUST 
65 COME BACK FROM COURT. ACCORDING TO MS. CROSBY, MR. NORRIS WAS VERY 
66 NERVOUS AND ASKED HER TO PULL THE FILES ON ALL OF THE PEOPLE THAT HE 
67 HAD SIGNED UP. MR. NORRIS THEN HAD MS. CROSBY BACK DATE CHECKS MADE 
68 OUT TO A BILL BLAYLOCK FOR THE DATES THAT DIFFERENT PEOPLE SIGNED UP. 
£Q IT MO TIME DID MS. CROSBY EVER SEE THE CHECKS ACTUALLY MAILED OFF OR 
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7 8 SHE WAS TELLING ME. THE SYNOPSIS WENT AS FOLLOWS. 
79 
80 MR. MORRIS WOULD PLACE A: : ADVERTISEMENT I! : T'HE PAPER OFFERING A 
81 JOB WITH A SALARY OF $1400.00 PLUS COMMISSIONS AND BEN E F I T S . WHEN THE 
8 2 PEOPLE WOULD RESPOND TO THE ADVERTISEMENTS FOR. A JOB THEY WERE GIVEN 
8 3 A PRESENTATION AND SOLD SOME PRODUCTS ON CONTRACT. WHEN PEOPLE WOULD 
8 4 TRY AND RETURN THE PRODUCTS THEY WOULD BE TOLD THAT THEY COULD NOT 
85 DUE TO THE. FACT THAT THEY HAD OPENED THE PRODUCTS AND TRIED IT AS MR. 
86 NORRIS HAD INSTRUCTED THEM TO DO. IF THEY DID LEAVE THE PRODUCTS BEH-
87 IND MR. NORRIS WOULD JUST RE-SEAL THEM AND GIVE THEM OUT AGAIN. AT NO 
88 TIME DID MR. NORRIS EVER PAY ANY SALES PEOPLE NOR GIVE THEM ANY BEN-
89 EflTS AS PROMISED I.* : THE AD1* :"ERT ISEMENT MS CROSBY AGREED V "ITH THIS 
90 SYNOPSIS, 
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91 
9 2 &ST.~CRQSBY STATED THAT SHE BAD'''A CONVERSATION WITH 'MR. MORRIS ON, 
93 SEVERAL OCCASIONS REGARDING HIS ADVERTISEMENT. MS. CROSBY CLAIMS THAT 
94 SHE TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS OBVIODS TO ^ HER.'THAT. MR. . NORRIS ..HAD* NO J NT EN-
95 TION OF1HIRING..EMPLOYEES A J ^ H E ^ A D ' V E R T I S E M E N T • DESCRIBED "liUSD^'lf APPE-
96 A R E F ' T O * HER" THAT MR.'^MSfe'RIS ' S INTENTIONS WERE TO M I S L E A D ^ P T L I C A N T S • 
97 INTO BELIEVING THAT THEY HAD EMPLOYMENT WHEN1 TN FACT T H E "'PAPAERS "THAT 
98 THEY'-WERE'-REQDESTED TO SIGN WERE IN FACT -PURCHASE-AGREEMENTS FOR ....THE,,. 
99 DIET-"PRODUCT.*" '* 
100 
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; r;;r;Y TENS >.T7:: r;:r roi.LowiNC V I C T I M S , JOAN Y.ATTFPN. huNNii: GESSEL AND 
• SL!SAN HUNTER/ THESE INTERVIEW'S KERE D<V:C :T MIST V.M.EEV r-r:.:cE EEPART-
:•:::•." AND \\\I,Z VIDEOTAPED. 
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:: IXTERVILK. wurx JC;,.\* ARRIVED TO A BUSINESS' NAMZD "LARCH: I:;TCR::ATICA"AL" 
:: SHE AND OTHERS WERE GIVEN A PRESENTATION 5V ::R. NORRIS. JOAN STATED 
2 3 THAT SHE ALSO TILLED OUT AN APPLICATION AND LETT A RESUME, SHE WAS 
24 ALSO GIVEN A COMPENSATION AGREEMENT THAT WAS SIGNED SY MR. NORRIS. 
25 . S 
2 6 JOAN:.STATED THAT SHE RETURKEfV-THP- XEXJ HAV FOR A SECOND INTERVIEW 
27 WITH.^MR. NORRIS. IT WAS AT THIS 'TNTERVIEW THAT SHE SIGNED SEVERAL CON-
20 TRACTS ,••• AMONGST W^ICH WAS A'CONTRACT THAT SHE THOUGHT WAS JUST AN 
29 AGREEiMENT TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILix'!?:-TrOR THE. PRODUCT? SHE WAS GIVEN AND 
3C WAS NOT "AWARF THAT IT WAS ACTUALLY AN AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE PRODUCT. 
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I OBTAINED COPIES FROM JOAX OF ALL COL'FT DOCUMENTS THAT WERE IN 
HER POSSESSION INVOLVING ABDIEL RIVERA-VELCZ . I ALSO OETAINED COi?IES 
OF STATEMENTS FROM JOAN ALONG WITH COPTF", or rnfRT CASE \T:MPFRS. 
I THEN MET WITH B(3NN-I<fr-*J£'Sb=.L>. £:.:.:_ .. .„.L.:^ -.: ^ . 
ERNATIONAL WAS AS FOLLOWS. ECN'NIE AXSXERED ' ADVERTISEMENT IN THE 
NEWSPAPER FOR A SALES JOB. THE AD OFFERED SALARY OR COMMISSION. BONNI! 
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- : : : r HAH r . r r r P;:P \ r r L : C A T : -:\ ; r.iii.-.D. I-O.NML WAS ASKED I F SHE WANTED A 
?
 J05 AVSW^KIX^ PHONES AND MAYING PHONE CALLS. BOXXIE TOOK THE .JOB. ONC: 
*."!" 'T'OZ 7* TEPNAT"!"'''^'.**. ,?*;P f\A£ OTVEN A SCRIPT T^ rr*.T; nvr.H TNT PI:CNr 
A P : L : :-.::::E '.\s E V . V A E E . E/. :;:-•. :•:<>:;? :s SHE PERSONALLY W I T N E S S E S 
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02 BONNI; FURTHER STATED THAT SHE DID RECEIVE : CHECKS FROM MR. NOR-
12 RIS. THESE CHECKS HAD TAXES TAKEN OUT BUT SHE NEVER FILLED OUT A K-4 
94. F()R^ r^ .^ tf4?fCTTTpT>ECEIVED A W-2 FORM FROM MR. NORR1S, WHEN SHE CONFRONT -
95 ED MR. NORRIS ABOUT THE TAXES TAKEN OUT OF HER CHECK HE STATED TO HER 
96 THAT HE GUESSED. TO THIS DAY BONNIE HAS NOT SEEN ABLE TO GET A W-2 
9 7 fRO>! Mi-.. XORRIS. 
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100 I THEN INTERVIEWED SCSAN HUNTER. IN WITH US DURING THAT INTERVIEW 
101 WAS HER HVSE-AND, JAMES UUXTER. ACCORDING TO SUSAN SHE HAD ANSWERED AN 
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SX3AX XXX'T OX TO STATE THAT >!R , XORRIS CLAi: 1EE TO HAVE OFFICES I 
0\, SEATTLE., PARX CITY AXE LOS AXCELES . I ASKED SUSAX IF c 7 •" O 
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Addendum F 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
ERNEST W.JONES, 1736 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
FILES DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 0 8 1399 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By-
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT <vV * ; AKE DEPARTMENT 





ORDER REGARDING STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS 
CaseNo.971008355FS 
I In mi I Iiilliiii K. Palmer 
The defendant's Motion to Dismiss based on the Statute of Limitations came on for 
hearing on April 2, 1999 at 9:00 a.in before the Honorable Phillip K. Palmer The State was 
represented by Ernest W l<mc\ Deputy District A Hi" HI tl 'lendanl « m. pKibehl iiii I 
represented by Michael R. Peterson, Salt Lake Legal Defender *vociation. The Court ha A i|.-, 
considered the memorandum of law and the oral arguments of counsel enters the following 
Findings of Fact: 
1. Hie defendant was originally charged on October 1, 1996 in Third District Court 
with felony counts of Communication Fraud pursuant to Section 76-10=1801, U.C.A. by the Salt 
Lake County District Atliii"u 
2. Those charges were quashed on December 10, 1996 by Judge Phillip Palmer 
because the West \ ailev misdemeanor case involving the same charges was still on appeal. 
3. s
 h-, . ,_ -ever 
Iisnnssed i ^ i cudizcb on Apn because the remittitur had not arrived from the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
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4. Felony charges were refiled on May 15, 1997 once the remittitur arrived at Third 
District Court. Judge Robin Reese stayed those charges while the defendant appealed the West 
Valley case to the Utah Supreme Court. 
5. The defendant appealed the matter to the Utah Supreme Court and the United 
States Supreme Court. 
6. A remittitur was issued on October 30, 1998 from the United States Supreme 
Court denying the defendant's appeal and remanding the case. 
The Court enters the following Conclusions of Law: 
1. The defendant's Motion to Dismiss based on the Statute of Limitations is denied. 
2. The filing date is May 15,1997 for the felony charges. 
3. The filing date is not October 30, 1998. Judge Dever never signed the 
defendant's proposed order requesting that filing date be October 30,1998. 
4. The motion to quash and the appeals filed by the defendant toll the running of the 
Statute of Limitations in this felony case. 
5. The defendant never suffered double jeopardy because he was never tried for the 
West Valley misdemeanor case. 
DATED this P^ day of yy^^ * " ., m .1 9 9 Q 
BYTHB^OURT: \ 
r* 
"1 ^ ^ y 
Thir^Distrtct CourUu^ge 
Approved as to Form: 
Michael R. Peterson 
Counsel for Defendant 
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OTFICATF OF DEU\ 
I hereby certify i i-i. -••
 r statute ui" 
Limitations was delivered to Michael R. Peterson, Attorney for Defendant RICHARD NORRIS, 
at 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the 7^ (day of April, 1999. 
1I f I'.' '\ \ 
Addendum G 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE ..I M 17M, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
9:,LJ P Norr 
& 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT, 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
AND ORDER 
CASE NO. &n i n WQ -gfe^i> 
Defendant. 
COML hJQfr] *> • • - defendant 
case and hereby acknowledges anc :'.+•• 
entering a plea of guiicy TO the following •.-. (s 




I Minimum Mandatory 




(&"\ 7 J 1 ^ _iJt£ 'v <* fr >-^ r 
3 / 1 8 / 9 9 
-2-
I have received a copy of the Information against me, I have 
read it, and I understand the nature and elements of the offense (s) 
for which I am pleading guilty. 
The elements of the crime (s) of which I am charged are as 
follows: 
My conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am 
criminally liable that constitutes the elements of the crime(s) 
charged, is as follows: U < 4 f A t f M ) ^"i a^ a Of 
—4<^—ffar^j&C* \ 
I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with 
knowledge and understanding of the following facts: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an 
attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be 
appointed by the Court at no cost to me. I recognize that a 
condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, as 
determined by the Court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so 
appointed for me. 
01190 
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2. I (have notS^haveywaived my right to counsel. If I have 
waived my right to counsel, I have done so knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
3. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this 
statement and understand the nature and elements of the charges, my 
rights in this case and other proceedings, and the consequences of 
my plea of guilty. 
4. If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is 
Crr€^ $ KorCfO>. and I have had an opportunity to fully 
discuss this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my 
guilty plea with my attorney. 
5. I know that I have a right to a speedy trial in open 
court by an impartial jury and that I am giving up that right by 
pleading guilty. 
6. I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to have them 
cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I have the right 
to compel my witness(s) by subpoena at State expense to testify in 
court in my behalf. I understand that I am giving up these rights 
if I plead guilty. 
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf; 
but if I choose not to do so I cannot be compelled to testify or 
give evidence against myself; and no adverse inferences will be 
drawn against me if I do not testify. I understand that I am 
giving up these rights if I plead guilty. 
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me I 
need only plead "not guilty," and the matter will be set for trial. 
At the trial the State of Utah will have the burden of proving each 
element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is 
before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous. 
m i n i 
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9. I understand the fact that as a defendant I enjoy the 
right of a presumption of innocence. I understand that I am 
presumed innocent until the State proves my guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, if this case is tried to a jury, or until I plead 
guilty. I understand that I give up the right to the presumption 
of innocence if I plead guilty. 
10. I know that under the Constitution of Utah, if I were 
tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge, I would have the 
right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah Court of 
Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court and that if I 
could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs 
would be paid by the State. I understand that I am giving up these 
rights if I plead guilty. 
11. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each 
offense to which I plead guilty. I know that by pleading guilty to 
an offense that carries a minimum mandatory sentence, I will be 
subjecting myself to serving a minimum mandatory sentence for that 
offense. I know that the sentence may be consecutive and may be 
for a prison term, fine, or both. I know that in addition to a 
fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. I 
also know that I may be ordered by the Court to make restitution to 
any victim(s) of my crimes, including any restitution that may be 
owed on charges that are dismissed, if any, as a result of this 
plea agreement. 
12. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, 
or the fine for an additional amount if my plea is to more than one 
charge. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or 
awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been 
convicted or to which I have pled guilty, my plea in the present 
action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
01102 
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13. I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am 
waiving and giving up my statutory and constitutional rights set 
out in the preceding paragraphs. I also know that by entering such 
plea(s), I am admitting and do so admit that I have committed the 
conduct alleged and that I am guilty of the crime (s) for which my 
plea(s) is/are entered. 
14. My plea(s) of guilty (is)(is not) the result of a plea 
bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney. The promises, 
duties, and provisions of this plea bargain, if any, are fully 
contained in this statement. 
15. I know and understand that any motion to withdraw my 
plea(s) of guilty must be for good cause, in writing, and must be 
filed within thirty (30) days after entry of my guilty plea. 
16. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a 
reduction of the charges for sentencing, made or sought by either 
defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the 
Judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what 
they believe the Court may do are also not binding on the Court. 
17. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind 
has been made to induce me to plead guilty, and no promises except 
those contained in this statement, have been made to me. 
18. I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me 
by my attorney, and I understand its provisions. I know that I am 
free to change or delete anything contained in this statement. I 
do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are 
correct. 
19. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my 
attorney. 
-6-
20. I am years of age; I have attended school through 
the \?^ grade; and I can read and understand the English 
language. If I do not understand English/ an interpreter has been 
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, 
medication, or intoxicants which would impair my judgment when the 
decision was made to enter the plea(s). I am not presently under 
the influence of any drugf medication/ or intoxicants which impair 
my judgment. 
21. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind; 
mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the 
consequences of my plea; and free of any mental disease, defect, or 
impairment that would prevent me from knowingly/ intelligently, and 
voluntarily entering my plea. I n T ti i/ 
22. Other: Ft*M« + l « 4 ^ **d ^ ^ 
rry..r¥ fAnr.*'! ^Ua^T' 4)<4<»nA*J^fr A v < U ^ 
<fi«rJ 
Dated this / / day of_ 1999, 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for. 
the defendant above, and that I know he/she has read the statement 
or that I have read it to him/her; and I have discussed it with 
him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of 
its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best 
of my knowledge and belief/ after an appropriate investigation, the 
elements of the crime (s) and the factual synopsis of the 
01104 
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defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along 
with the other representations and declarations made by the 
defendant in the foregoing affidavit/ are accurate and true. 
/ 
YIFOR DEFENDANT/BAR # 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the 
case against *•» • - • ^  /- , defendant. I have 
reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual 
basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the 
offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, 
or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The 
plea negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the 
attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the 
Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence 
would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for 
which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance of the 
plea(s) would serve the public interest. 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY/BAR # 
ORDER 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and 
the certification of the defendant and counsel, the Court witnesses 
the signatures and finds that the defendant's plea(s) of guilty is 
freely and voluntarily made, and it is so ordered that the 
01195 
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defendant's plea(s) of guilty to the charge(s) set forth in the 
Statement be accepted and entered. 
Dated this I / day of_ , 1999. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
